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I. INTRODUCTION
For the last fourteen years, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and many states have structured their civil and criminal Clean Air
Act (CAA) asbestos enforcement programs upon a bulk material test
method that has never been promulgated into law through administrative
rulemaking. In so doing, the federal and state governments disregard the
only bulk material test method for asbestos content enumerated by law
for CAA compliance. The particular test method used in an enforcement
proceeding is highly consequential: it effectively defines the universe of
material that is subject to regulation under the asbestos National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (asbestos NESHAP).T1
Changing the asbestos NESHAP’s test method, as the EPA did
informally in 1993, alters the jurisdictional reach of the regulation
1. The EPA regulates the emissions of air toxics, such as asbestos, through a
series of National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs)
promulgated under the 1990 amendments to the CAA. See 40 C.F.R. pts. 61, 63 (2006).
The EPA’s regulation to limit significant asbestos fiber releases during demolition and
renovation projects is known as the “asbestos NESHAP.” 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.140–.157
(2006).
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immediately; that is, certain formerly lawful conduct becomes instantly
unlawful. At least two courts—one federal district court and one state
appellate court—concluded almost simultaneously in 2006 that the EPA’s
asbestos NESHAP enforcement program, to the extent it is predicated
upon nonbinding test methods, raises profound administrative law and
constitutional due process complications.
The legal analysis starts with two basic facts. First, there is one test
method mandated by law for quantifying a material’s asbestos content
for purposes of the asbestos NESHAP, a method which is incorporated
into the very definition of “friable asbestos material” and “regulated
asbestos-containing material” (RACM).2 Second, that test method was
promulgated into law by the EPA as part of the 1990 amendments to the
asbestos NESHAP and has remained on the books without modification
ever since (“1990 test method”).3
In 1993, however, the EPA made a policy choice to disregard the one
and only asbestos test method mandated by law in favor of a new test.
The EPA concluded within only a few years of adoption of the 1990
test method that the test was deficient, especially with respect to
multilayered systems. The EPA effectively rewrote the 1990 test method
through a series of “clarifications,” coupled with widespread circulation
of a preferred test method in 1993 (“1993 test method”). The EPA took
no legal steps whatsoever either to rescind or supersede the 1990 test
method.
The due process implications of the EPA’s 1993 policy decision to
switch tests finally coalesced in 2006 in separate criminal and civil
proceedings. Due process instructs that criminal prosecutions rest upon
statutes and promulgated regulations only, not on agency “policy” or
discretionary test methods that have never been adopted into law. This
maxim is especially applicable where an agency does not purport simply
to interpret an existing regulation, but instead to replace the promulgated
2. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2006) (defining “friable asbestos material” and
“nonfriable asbestos-containing material”).
3. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos
NESHAP Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406 (Nov. 20, 1990). The 1990 test method
incorporates by reference U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM METHOD FOR THE
DETERMINATION OF ASBESTOS IN BULK INSULATION SAMPLES (1982), which was
previously codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E (2006) in 1987 as Title II of
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and the asbestos program for schools
implemented by the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986 (AHERA), Pub.
L. No. 99-519, 10 Stat. 2970 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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regulatory definitions and test method.4 To be enforceable, such a
change in the governing regulation must be accomplished through CAA
rulemaking with public participation and judicial review. In fact, the
CAA specifically mandates that all NESHAP test methods must be
developed and promulgated through the rulemaking procedures set forth
in the statute itself.5 Applying this irreducible constitutional principle to
the EPA’s asbestos NESHAP enforcement program, the EPA (and
delegated states) continues to openly defy basic constitutional safeguards
by prosecuting companies and individuals based upon the weight and
findings of a nonbinding asbestos test method.
Two cases of first impression, decided within one month of each other
in 2006, vindicate the long-standing due process principle that no
prosecution can lie where the government relies upon the findings of
nonbinding test methods that have never been subjected to rulemaking.
In January 2006, the federal government indicted San Diego Gas &
Electric Company (SDG&E) for the first time in its 125-year history,
two employees, and an outside contractor for the removal of multilayered,
coal tar pipe coating by licensed and qualified asbestos abatement
subcontractors.6 None of the project’s asbestos abatement contractors
was indicted—only the property owner, two employees, and the project’s
general contractor. In United States v. San Diego Gas & Electric, there
was no dispute that the removal project was entirely lawful if the
quantity of asbestos in the pipe coating material was one percent or less.
Stated differently, unless the quantity of asbestos in the multilayered
SDG&E pipe coating material exceeded the one percent jurisdictional

4. Not even the Administrator’s interpretations of his own regulations can
cure an omission or add certainty and definiteness to otherwise vague language.
The prohibited conduct must, for criminal purposes, be set forth with clarity in
the regulations and orders which he is authorized by Congress to promulgate
under the Act . . . . And certainly a criminal conviction ought not to rest upon
an interpretation reached by the use of policy judgments rather than by the
inexorable command of relevant language.
M. Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 622, 626 (1946) (reversing conviction
under World War II commodity price regulation).
[T]he responsibility to promulgate clear and unambiguous standards is on the
[agency]. The test is not what [the agency] might possibly have intended, but
what [was] said. If the language is faulty, the [agency] had the means and
obligation to amend. Thus, reliance on policies underlying a statute cannot be
treated as a substitute for the agency’s duty to promulgate clear and definitive
regulations.
United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp., 60 F.3d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1995) (vacating civil
asbestos NESHAP penalty) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(b)(5), 7607(d) (2000).
6. Indictment, United States v. San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 06CR0065 DMS
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2006).
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threshold to become “regulated asbestos-containing material,” or RACM,
the asbestos NESHAP and its “work practices” did not apply at all.
In July 2003, the State of Wisconsin filed suit seeking to impose
substantial civil penalties on a licensed asbestos abatement contractor for
the removal of multilayered, asbestos-containing wall systems in the
Milwaukee Auditorium under a delegated state asbestos program identical
to the federal asbestos NESHAP program.7 In 2005, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the State, but the court of appeals reversed in
October 2006 on the ground that the State cannot impose liability based
on a nonbinding test method.8 In State of Wisconsin v. Harenda
Enterprises, there was no dispute that depending upon the test method
used, the asbestos content of the multilayered wall system at issue either
exceeded or fell below the one percent jurisdictional threshold for the
NESHAP work practices to apply. The State conceded that if the 1990
test method is used, the Milwaukee Auditorium wall system is not
regulated. Contrary to the EPA’s position in the federal SDG&E case,
Wisconsin argued, and the trial court agreed, that the 1990 test method is
“not clear,” which the trial court believed opened the door to examine
two EPA clarifications purporting to adopt the 1993 test method.9
The crux of the EPA’s and Wisconsin’s constitutional dilemma is that
the 1990 test method, incorporated directly into core definitions of the
asbestos regulation, operates to draw a bright, jurisdictional dividing line
between lawful and unlawful activity. Changing the test method moves
that line, with dramatic consequences to individuals and corporations
who are charged with violating the asbestos NESHAP. The 1990 test
method upon which asbestos-containing material and RACM are
explicitly defined calculates asbestos content based upon the average of
all layers of multilayered material. The nonbinding 1993 test method
7. Civil Complaint, State v. Wis. Ctr. Dist., 724 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. Ct. App.
2006) (Unclassified Civil No. 30703); State v. Harenda Enters., Inc., 724 N.W.2d 434
(Wis. Ct. App. 2006), rev. granted, 732 N.W.2d 857 (Wis. 2007); Brief of PlaintiffRespondent at 20, State v. Harenda Enters., Inc., 724 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006)
(No. 2005AP1829).
8. Harenda, 724 N.W.2d at 439.
9. See Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 7, at 3–8 (quoting trial court’s
analysis). In SDG&E, the government argued that the “EPA need not have complied
with rulemaking procedures because the single-layer test method is merely a ‘clarification’ of
the averaging test method.” Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Counts 1, 2, 3 and 5 of
the Indictment for Failure to State an Offense Involving Jurisdictional Amount of “Regulated”
Asbestos-Containing Material at 7:17–19, United States v. San Diego Gas & Elec., No.
06CR0065 DMS (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2006).
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does not. The nonbinding test method upon which both the SDG&E and
Harenda Enterprises cases are based asks the much narrower question of
whether any single layer (or any portion thereof) exceeds one percent
asbestos, in which event the “entire material is deemed to be regulated
asbestos containing material.”10 By definition, the 1993 test method therefore
reports artificially high concentrations of asbestos for multilayered
material and positively identifies certain material as “regulated” material
that would not exceed the law’s jurisdictional threshold under the 1990
test method.
The federal court in SDG&E concluded in November 2006 that the
indictment was fatally defective because the government’s theory of
prosecution effectively rewrote the regulation without rulemaking.11
The court dismissed all asbestos NESHAP counts of the indictment.12
SDG&E also noted that if the government was allowed to prosecute five
to six years after project completion and in the absence of any intact
multilayered coating material, the defendants would be deprived of the
ability to vindicate themselves using the only scientific test method
authorized by law to demonstrate that their conduct was lawful during
active subcontractor removal operations in 2000 and 2001.13
SDG&E and Harenda Enterprises exposed the widening gulf between
the EPA policy in 2006 and the binding NESHAP jurisdictional 1990
test method. The EPA favors the newer and nonbinding 1993 test method
because the promulgated 1990 test method excludes material that the
EPA now believes ought to be, but is not, regulated. Under well-settled
due process principles and interpretative canons of strict regulatory
construction in criminal cases, if the literal language of the asbestos
NESHAP and its enumerated test method is faulty in the EPA’s view, it
has the “means and obligation to amend” that regulation before sanctions
are available to the government.14 The government cannot unilaterally
10. See Government Bill of Particulars at 9:18–22, United States v. San Diego Gas
& Elec., No. 06CR0065 DMS (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2006).
11. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 9–13. The government
obtained a second indictment on February 27, 2007, describing the court’s dismissal of
the first indictment as a quarrel with the proper language. SDG&E, 3 Workers Are
Indicted Again, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 28, 2007, at B3.
12. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 17. The Government
reindicted on February 27, 2007 under the theory that it has now been able to perform
the appropriate testing set forth in the asbestos NESHAP. Indictment, United States v.
San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 07CR0484 DMS (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2007).
13. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 5:5–9.
14. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n,
573 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1978) (invalidating order finding OSHA safety work practice
violation, stating, “The responsibility to promulgate clear and unambiguous standards is
upon the Secretary. The test is not what he might possibly have intended, but what he
said. If the language is faulty, the Secretary has the means and the obligation to amend.”).
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disregard RACM’s definition and the asbestos NESHAP’s enumerated,
jurisdictional test method, both elements of a NESHAP crime, as “words
of no consequence”15 and develop instead common law test methods and
crimes. Because the 1990 test method applies equally to the TSCA schools
program and asbestos testing in schools and public buildings under the
Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986 (AHERA) and its
regulations,16 the due process lessons drawn from SDG&E and Harenda
Enterprises apply with equal force to other enforcement programs as well.
By the EPA’s own admission, the differences between the nonbinding
1993 and the promulgated 1990 test methods are substantive and not
interpretative. The EPA concedes in the introduction of the 1993 test
method that it “contains significant revisions” to the enumerated 1990 test
method and adds “new procedures” that expand the universe of regulated
material.17 Upon promulgating the 1990 test method as part of the 1990
amendments to the asbestos NESHAP, the EPA admitted that it would
have to undergo CAA rulemaking and judicial review if it wanted to
amend the regulation’s test method at any time in the future.18 Indeed,
the EPA went so far as to commit in 1995 to “amend the asbestos
NESHAP in the near future” to make the 1993 test method new law.19 It
has never done so. In the absence of EPA rulemaking to modify the
definition of RACM and the NESHAP’s enumerated test method, seven
states have felt compelled in the last ten years to adopt the 1993 test method
into their respective state asbestos regulations, one on an “emergency”
basis in June 2006.20
Taken together, SDG&E and Harenda Enterprises address important
due process issues of first impression under the CAA and AHERA.
These are the first test cases since the 1973 promulgation of the asbestos
15. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140, 149 (1994) (reversing conviction
where element of crime treated as surplusage).
16. Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-519, 10
Stat. 2970 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also the promulgated
AHERA regulations at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763 (2006).
17. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/R-93/116, METHOD FOR THE DETERMINATION
OF ASBESTOS IN BULK BUILDING MATERIALS 1 (1993).
18. EMISSIONS STANDARDS DIVISION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-450/3-90017, NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR ASBESTOS—BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR
PROMULGATED ASBESTOS NESHAP REVISIONS 4-16 (1990).
19. Asbestos NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of Multi-Layered
Systems, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,243 (Dec. 19, 1995).
20. See infra notes 38–40 and accompanying text; see also Testing of Bulk Material
Samples, 38 N.J. Reg. 2526-29 (June 5, 2006).
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NESHAP work practices regulation to address whether the government
can demonstrate material is “regulated” under the asbestos NESHAP for
purposes of imposing penal sanctions on the weight of a discretionary
agency test method of choice.21 Paradoxically, in SDG&E, the government
elected to test its pioneering reinterpretation of the NESHAP and
RACM’s definition at the expense and potential freedom of individuals,
and even in the face of hundreds of contemporaneous project-specific air
and soil data demonstrating no releases of asbestos fibers whatsoever
during the (licensed subcontractor) removal operations. It was a formover-substance prosecution.
The government’s criminal and civil application of a nonbinding test
method in substitution of the enumerated test effectively rewrites the law
and confers upon the government arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
power. It would effectively create a common law crime, which due
process principles of fair warning and lenity forbid. Under the 1993 test
method, or any other nonbinding test method of choice, the government
could systematically thin or physically alter any multi- or single-layered
material to a sufficient pinch, slice, or dimension to push nonregulated
material over to the criminal side of the jurisdictional dividing line.
“[A] criminal prosecution is not the place to decide pioneering
interpretations of the law.”22 Nor is the purpose of criminal law to
“penalize frank differences of opinion”23 or settle an unresolved battle of

21. There are well over 100 published and unpublished civil and criminal asbestos
NESHAP cases. The vast majority are civil disputes regarding above-ground building
materials where the jurisdictional application of the NESHAP regulation to the particular
material at issue has never been disputed. Most cases postdate the 1990 NESHAP
amendments and involve common denominators such as dry removal of above-ground
building materials, unlicensed workers, failure to notify, or improper disposal or
abandonment of waste at unlicensed facilities. One administrative EPA Environmental
Appeals Board decision concluded that the 1993 test method could support a $9160
penalty based upon the weight of two post-1990 EPA clarifications purporting to
disallow averaging for multilayered material under the 1990 test method. See In re LVI
Envtl. Servs., Inc., 10 E.A.D. 99, 106 (2001) (concluding Category I asphalt roofing
material is regulated where any single layer is above 1%, even though asbestos content
falls below 1% when all layers are averaged under the 1990 test method). Both the
SDG&E and Harenda Enterprises courts disregarded the EPA administrative law judge’s
2001 opinion as having no persuasive or binding force.
22. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1497, 1501 (C.D. Cal.
1986), rev’d, 828 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d
1160, 1164 (4th Cir. 1974) (reversing tax conviction where the Government was literally
in dispute with itself over whether income at issue was taxable)) (finding indictment
based on vague military contract, voluntarily dismissed later by Government).
23. See United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1428 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating
legality of specific tax shelters which were subject of prosecution was “completely
unsettled”).
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the experts.24 Under no circumstances may the government criminalize
otherwise lawful conduct that it purports crosses a jurisdictional dividing
line based upon a “recommended” and nonbinding test method that
disregards enumerated law. Yet the EPA and various states continue to
defy these constitutional safeguards to advance evolving policies and
priorities of their respective CAA enforcement programs.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE ASBESTOS NESHAP TEST METHOD
A. Asbestos NESHAP 1990 Test Method
To appreciate the dramatic and ongoing divergence of law and EPA
policy, one must look at the asbestos NESHAP’s evolution and history.
For the first seventeen years of the asbestos NESHAP’s existence
(1973–1990), the asbestos content of material was measured on the basis
of percentage weight, and no particular test method was enumerated by
the regulation. By 1990, the EPA had decided it was “long overdue” to
adopt a specific test method to determine asbestos content to “reduce
confusion over what activities are subject to the regulation.”25 The EPA
initiated rulemaking to, among other things, clarify the regulation’s
weight-based standard (with no test method) because the EPA had
concluded that a one percent dry-weight standard tended to underestimate
asbestos quantity in denser materials.26
Instead of developing an entirely new analytical test method to
quantify asbestos for NESHAP purposes alone, the EPA incorporated a
preexisting asbestos test method that had twice been through EPA
rulemaking in 1982 and 1987 under different, non-CAA regulations.27
That 1990 test method was incorporated into the very definition of
“friable asbestos material” under the NESHAP and therefore is a fundamental

24. See Order at 7, United States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1128 (D.
Mont. 2006) (No. CR 05-07-M-DWM), appeal docketed, No. 06-30472 (9th Cir. Sept. 5,
2006) (rejecting prospect of allowing battling experts to define at trial whether particular
forms of asbestos fibers are regulated by NESHAP).
25. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 4-8.
26. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos
NESHAP Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406, 48,410 (Nov. 20, 1990) (noting that cementbased fireproofing material containing unregulated amount of less than 1% asbestos by
weight actually contains 30% asbestos by area).
27. See Interim Method for the Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Insulation
Samples, 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E (2006), which was incorporated into the
EPA’s TSCA and AHERA programs.
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component of the definition of RACM.28 Unlike the nonbinding 1993 test
method, the 1990 test method mandates a multistep analysis of all layers
of the material to generate a composite or average asbestos percentage
result for the material as a whole:
Bulk samples of building materials taken for the identification and quantitation
of asbestos are first examined for homogeneity. . . . When discrete strata are
identified, each is treated as a separate material so that fibers are first
identified and quantified in that layer only, and then the results for each layer
are combined to yield an estimate of asbestos content for the whole sample.29

Implicit within the “whole sample” concept set forth in the 1990 test
method is the requirement to determine the average asbestos content
based upon a weighted average of the multilayered system that accounts
for the relative thicknesses of the individual layers. Wisconsin argued in
Harenda Enterprises that the 1990 test method must account for relative
thicknesses of individual layers to avoid “absurd results.”30 The court of
appeals noted that, absent averaging of the thickness of individual layers,
absurd outcomes were possible, but it did not need to reach the question
of whether the combination of the asbestos content of each separate
layer “is done in reference to the mass, weight, or volume of each layer.
Accordingly, we apply the one-percent threshold without further
refinement . . . .”31 Likewise, the SDG&E court did not need to reach
that issue to rule the indictment defective.
B. The EPA’s Nonbinding 1993 Test Method
Within only a few years of the 1990 promulgation of the first and only
asbestos NESHAP test method, the EPA concluded that the 1990 test
method excluded certain multilayered materials from the definition of
RACM. Multilayered materials that ought to be regulated in the EPA’s
view fell below the NESHAP’s one percent threshold under the literal
application and averaging of the 1990 test method. In 1993, the EPA
therefore decided that a new asbestos test method was desirable.32
The 1993 test method promised “significant revisions” to the 1990 test
method and “new procedures.”33 Included among the significant revisions
28. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2006).
29. 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E § 1.7.2.1 (2006) (Gross Examination)
(emphasis added).
30. State v. Harenda Enters., Inc., 724 N.W.2d 434, 439 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006),
rev. granted, 732 N.W.2d 857 (Wis. 2007) (using example of multilayered wall made of
twelve inches of styrofoam insulation covered by a quarter inch of plaster containing 5%
asbestos).
31. Id. at 436 n.2.
32. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 17, at 1.
33. Id.
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was an emphatic rejection of the multilayered averaging of asbestos content
mandated by the 1990 test method.34 A comparison of the 1990 test
method and the 1993 test method for multilayered material is set forth
below.
1990 Test Method (1990
NESHAP Amendments)

1993 Test Method
(1993)

Promulgated through CAA
or non-CAA rulemaking (3
times: 1982 TSCA, 1987
AHERA, 1990 NESHAP).

Never promulgated through
rulemaking and not part of the
definition of RACM.

Multilayered analysis
required.

Only single-layer or sub-layer
analysis recommended.

Asbestos content based on
average for all layers.

Each layer of multilayered material
separately analyzed and if any of the
individual layers, standing alone,
exceeds 1% asbestos, then entire
multilayered material is deemed
“regulated.”

Laboratory makes no
determination of friability of
sample.

Laboratory determines friability of
sample based on broader nonNESHAP definition set forth in
Appendix A of 1993 test method,
which is measured by the
“disaggregation” of sample by
laboratory instruments and analyst.

34.

Id. at 6–7.
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More complete and accurate
quantitation of asbestos
fibers.

Less accurate “visual area
estimation” techniques.35

Intact and representative
multilayered sample of
original thickness required
(all layers).

No intact, representative,
multilayered sample required; pipe
wrap sample must be three to four
square inches of layered material;
anything less than fifteen grams
considered “small quantity” bulk
sample and subject to reliability
precautions and rejection risk.

By the EPA’s own admission, the “much improved”36 1993 test
method substantially expands the universe of “regulated” material to
include material not otherwise above the one percent threshold under the
1990 test method.
Because the [1990 test method] allowed the result to be reported as one number,
multi-layered samples which may contain asbestos in a single layer may have
been reported by laboratories as nonasbestos-containing. The improved method
directs laboratories to analyze and report a result for individual layers. . . . [A]
multi-layered sample which previously was determined to be nonasbestoscontaining may now have layers which will be classified as asbestos-containing
based on the presence of asbestos in greater than 1 percent.37

Since 1990, and in the absence of federal rulemaking modifying the
jurisdictional NESHAP test method, at least seven states have expressly
adopted the 1993 test method in whole or in part into their respective
35. Experts describe visual estimation methods now favored by the EPA under the
1993 test method as “significantly less accurate” than the techniques of the 1990 test
method. See Robert L. Perkins et al., The One Percent Dilemma, ENVTL. INFO. ASS’N J.,
Summer 1994, at 7, 10 (noting 92% of NVLAP-certified laboratories overestimated
asbestos content of test samples because of human error, including one 60% result
containing in actuality only 0.5% asbestos; NVLAP laboratory “overestimation of
asbestos in bulk samples” is found to be “pervasive”); Robert L. Perkins, Point-Counting
Technique for Friable Asbestos-Containing Materials, 38 MICROSCOPE, 1990, at 29,
33–34 (stating visual estimation techniques “tend to be on the high side” and affected by
“analyst bias” compared to 1990 test method techniques); James S. Webber et al.,
Quantitating Asbestos Content in Friable Bulk Samples: Development of a Stratified
Point-Counting Method, 51 AM. INDUS. HYGIENE ASS’N J. 447, 447 (1990).
36. Letter from Michael E. Beard, EPA Atmospheric Research and Exposure
Assessment Lab., to all Asbestos Analytical Laboratories (Sept. 7, 1993) (on file with
authors).
37. Advisory Regarding Availability of an Improved Asbestos Bulk Sample Analysis
Test Method, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,970, 38,971 (Aug. 1, 1994) (emphasis added).
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state asbestos regulations.38 In 2002, for example, Texas enacted rules to
disallow averaging under the 1990 test method for multilayered materials.39
In 2006, New Jersey adopted the 1993 test method in substitution for the
1990 test method in emergency rulemaking because New Jersey contractors
were relying upon the literal language of the 1990 test method to exclude
material as nonregulated to the dismay of state regulators.40
The EPA’s actions since it publicly distributed the 1993 test method to
testing laboratories underscore that the test method has never been
adopted into law and remains nonbinding:
1. In September 1993, the EPA provided a courtesy notice of its
“much improved” 1993 test method to all the asbestos analytical
laboratories in the nation.41 The EPA acknowledged in its letter that
the 1990 test method “remains the EPA compliance monitoring
method and must be used for AHERA and NESHAP monitoring
until further notice,” but the EPA stated the NESHAP test method’s
longevity has been cast into serious doubt because “the agency is
considering replacing the [1990 test method] with this newer,
improved [1993 test method] procedure.”42
2. In January 1994, the EPA responded to “many questions” from
industry regarding averaging of the asbestos content of multilayered
material under the 1990 test method to determine whether the
material is regulated.43 The EPA criticized ongoing averaging under
the 1990 test method, with one exception—certain multilayered wall
systems. Seven months later, on August 1, 1994, the EPA announced

38. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, § 2711 (2006) (amending 22 La. Reg. 699
(Aug. 1996) and prohibiting averaging of bulk sample content); 06-096-425 ME. CODE
R. § 4 (Weil 2003) (mandating 1993 test method for flooring samples); 453 MASS. CODE
REGS. 6.08 (2006); MINN. R. 4620.3460 (1996) (prohibiting averaging as set forth in the
EPA’s second clarification); 20 Minn. Reg. 2765, 2770 (June 24, 1996); 38 N.J. Reg.
2526 (June 5, 2006); 25 TEXAS ADMIN. CODE § 295.32 (2007); 18 VA. ADMIN. CODE §
15-20-459.3 (2006).
39. 27 Tex. Reg. 11,424, 11,426, 11,443 (Dec. 6, 2002).
40. See Testing of Bulk Material Samples, 38 N.J. Reg. 2526-29 (June 5, 2006).
41. See Letter from Michael E. Beard, EPA Atmospheric Research and Exposure
Assessment Lab., to all Asbestos Analytical Laboratories (Sept. 7, 1993) (on file with
authors).
42. Id.
43. See Asbestos NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of Multi-layered
Systems, 59 Fed. Reg. 542 (Jan. 5, 1994).
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in the Federal Register the availability of an “improved” scientific
test method (the 1993 test method) that explicitly rejects averaging.44
3. In 1995, the EPA was forced to respond yet again to ongoing
public frustration in harmonizing the NESHAP’s 1990 test method
(averaging) and the nonbinding 1993 test method (no averaging).45
In the face of the irreconcilable positions of the two test methods,
the EPA elected to point to its long-standing “unwritten policy”
against averaging.46 The EPA admonished industry that its regulatory
objectives are more accurately set forth in the nonpromulgated 1993
test method, and EPA promised to amend the NESHAP regulation
to make the 1993 test method binding new law.47 The agency has
never done so.
In practical terms, the 1993 test method remains today, at most, a
nonbinding, regulatory safe harbor to ascertain whether material is potentially
regulated by the asbestos NESHAP, because the 1993 test method is
deliberately calculated to encompass a broader range of materials than
the NESHAP itself mandates. Stated differently, the nonbinding method
is deliberately overinclusive. The SDG&E and Harenda Enterprises cases
present a different issue, however, and one of first impression under the
asbestos NESHAP: whether the EPA’s “unwritten policy” about what
ought to be regulated using nonbinding and discretionary test methods
can be applied outside a promulgated regulation as an instrument of
prosecution. At least two courts have rejected the enforceability of the
EPA’s “unwritten policy.”
III. ASBESTOS MATERIAL TESTING IN UNITED STATES V. SDG&E
AND STATE V. HARENDA ENTERPRISES
The material at issue in SDG&E comprised 9.23 miles of coated
natural gas underground pipelines that were buried at a sixteen acre site
for five decades.48 The natural gas storage facility was constructed in
1953 to 1955 and decommissioned in 1999. The pipes were unearthed
and removed over the course of several months during 2000 and 2001.
44. See Advisory Regarding Availability of an Improved Asbestos Bulk Sample
Analysis Test Method; Supplementary Information on Bulk Sample Collection and
Analysis, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,970 (Aug. 1, 1994).
45. See Asbestos NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of Multi-Layered
Systems, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,243 (Dec. 19, 1995).
46. Id. at 65,243.
47. Id.
48. The background facts of the SDG&E case are set forth in SDG&E’s motion to
declare the case complex. Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion to Declare Case Complex at 3–10, United States v. San Diego Gas &
Elec., No. 06CR0065 DMS (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2006).
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The pipe coating material was tested with the pipe in situ before and
more extensively after pipe access became available upon trenching. The
pipe coating was removed by licensed asbestos abatement subcontractors
on-site both manually and mechanically with the oversight of California
certified asbestos consultants. The removed anti-corrosive pipe coating
was sent to a licensed asbestos disposal facility. Three separate courtesy
notices of nonfriable operations were provided to the delegated county
air pollution control district. County air inspectors visited the site over
twenty times. All air and soil testing demonstrated no releases of asbestos
fibers contemporaneously with removal operations.49
County inspectors became concerned in response to citizen noise and
odor complaints that mechanical removal would render the coating
friable and issued notices of violation. EPA Region 9 was consulted,
which concluded during a one-hour field inspection in January 2001
that, although the coating was nonfriable while affixed on the pipe,
any mechanical removal would render asbestos-containing material
regulated. The EPA did not then observe the machine in operation.
Years after project completion, the County of San Diego sued SDG&E’s
parent company, Sempra Energy, in August 2005 for over $1.5 million
in civil penalties but summarily dismissed the civil action seven months
later in March 2006 during depositions of its inspectors.50
The federal government indicted SDG&E in January 2006 and, for the
first time, performed material testing on six remaining 2001 coating
samples at the EPA’s National Enforcement Investigations Center in
Denver, Colorado.
All project contractor and government asbestos bulk samples of the
pipe coating from 1998 to 2006, including all EPA tests following the
indictment, adhered exclusively to the nonbinding 1993 test method
NVLAP-certified laboratories are required to perform. The government
so admitted.51 No bulk samples were analyzed under the 1990 test method

49. Air testing was performed separately by the project contractors, California
certified asbestos consultants, County of San Diego regulators, and even the California
EPA. Over 300 air samples and 180 soil samples were obtained with no detections of
any asbestos fibers during or after on-site abatement operations. Id. at 7.
50. See Complaint, People v. Sempra Energy, No. GIE028660 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 30, 2005); Dismissal, People v. Sempra Energy, No. GIE028660 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Mar. 28, 2006).
51. Government Bill of Particulars, supra note 10, at 9:18–22.
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by any laboratory from 1998 to 2006.52 Nor did sufficient physical
evidence remain, in the view of the defense, five to six years after
project completion to faithfully perform the 1990 test method for the
original 9.23 miles of multilayered pipe coating material.
The former SDG&E pipe coating material was a multilayered, coal
tar-based coating comprised of the following: (i) primer coating on the
bare steel pipe; (ii) one application of hot coal tar enamel (similar in
texture to coal tar used in roofing operations); (iii) fiberglass felt; (iv) a
second application of hot coal tar enamel; (v) coal tar saturated “asbestos
felt”; and (vi) white wash to reduce solar heating.53 The government
conceded the SDG&E pipe coating material was “made up of multiple
layers,” which were “distinct and dissimilar.”54
Coal tar pipe wrap specifications in the 1950s were well established
within the pipe industry and comprised multilayered material affixed
together by various layers of hot coal tar enamel that bonded all layers
into a permanently cohesive composite material upon cooling.55 Once
applied under extremely high-temperature conditions (over 400°F), the
coal tar coating and its embedded layers were permanently affixed and
did not delaminate or “peel like an onion” upon removal. The saturated
asbestos felt layer (a commercial and patented product from companies
such as Allied Chemical and Johns-Manville)56 is itself saturated within
a type of coal tar and formed into long sheets and stored on heavy rolls
(like pulp paper rolls) for future application at a coating plant or in the
field. Saturated asbestos felt is black and described as having the
consistency of heavy, coal tar roofing paper and is occasionally confused
with, but is different than, roofing paper.57
Asbestos-containing coal tar pipe wrap has been used by the utility
industry for many decades on thousands of miles of pipe,58 and such
52. In SDG&E, a total of seventy-five bulk samples were analyzed by five
different laboratories between 1998 and 2006. Defendants’ Points and Authorities in
Support of Joint Motion to Dismiss Counts 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the Indictment for Failure to
State an Offense Involving Jurisdictional Amount of Regulated Asbestos-Containing
Material at 11–13, United States v. San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 06CR0065 DMS (S.D.
Cal. Oct. 18, 2006).
53. See id. at 12–13 (pipe coating field specifications); accord KOPPERS CO.,
BITUMASTIC PIPE LINE HANDBOOK 9–11 (1953).
54. Government Bill of Particulars, supra note 10, at 9:11–19.
55. See KOPPERS CO., supra note 53, at 40–46 (providing coal tar coating
applications at relevant time, including multilayered construction).
56. See Asbestos Pipeline Felt, U.S. Patent No. 3,607,515 (filed July 18, 1967);
NAT’L ASS’N OF PIPE COATING APPLICATORS, INTERIM SPECIFICATIONS FOR SATURATED
ASBESTOS PIPELINE FELT § 5-69 (1969).
57. See KOPPERS CO., supra note 53, at 10, 13, 42–43, 44, 52, 64–66.
58. See id. at 11, 44–45, 64; JOHNS-MANVILLE CORP., PRODUCTS HANDBOOK 46
(1955) (discussing Transhield® asbestos pipe line felt and stating that asbestos felt “now
protects more than 100,000 miles of oil and gas pipe lines”); JOHNS-MANVILLE CORP.,
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coating has been both removed and applied mechanically in the field.
Asbestos-containing pipe wrap was banned from commerce with most
other asbestos products starting on August 27, 1990,59 but applications of
asbestos-containing coal tar pipe wrap remain on many active pipelines
around the country.
In SDG&E, the thickness of the entire pipe coating in its original field
condition (pre-removal) was described by third party eyewitnesses as
approximately one-half to one inch in thickness.60 Using the nonbinding
1993 test method, the government instead purported to test after the
2006 indictment a one millimeter-thick “piece” of one layer of the
coating only, after physically isolating any remnants of the embedded
asbestos felt layer using a microscope and laboratory instruments.61
Between 1998 and 2006, a total of seventy-five pipe coating bulk
samples were tested by five different laboratories, including tests by
three nongovernment and two government laboratories (one state and
one federal).62 There was no dispute regarding the specific test method
upon which the California and Wisconsin prosecutions were based.
Preliminarily, in SDG&E, the government conceded in its Bill of
Particulars that its indictment was based exclusively upon the 1993 test
method. Citing to the EPA’s 1994 clarification of multilayered testing,
the federal government explained the 1993 test method upon which its
prosecution rested as follows:
If a material believed to contain asbestos consists of several distinct and
dissimilar layers, each layer must be separately analyzed for its asbestos
content. If any of the layers, standing alone, meets the definition of regulated
asbestos containing material (i.e., over 1% asbestos and friable), then the entire
material is deemed to be regulated asbestos containing material, and the
NESHAP work practice standards are applicable to the project.63

JM PRODUCTS MANUAL 48 (1935) (describing “J-M Asbestos Pipe Line Felt[’s]” strength
to protect coating and resist soil chemicals, water and bacteria).
59. After ten years of work, the EPA promulgated a rule banning most commercial
asbestos products in three stages. Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing and
Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460 (July 12, 1989). Asbestoscontaining pipe wrap was banned in “stage 1,” effective August 27, 1990. Parts of that
rule were judicially invalidated in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th
Cir. 1991).
60. Defendants’ Points and Authorities, supra note 52, at 14–15.
61. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NAT’L ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATIONS CENTER,
NEIC RP1134R01 at 5, tbl. 1 (2006) (all testing limited to “1-mm thick piece”).
62. See Defendants’ Points and Authorities, supra note 52.
63. Government Bill of Particulars, supra note 10, at 9:18–22 (emphasis added).

189

HOWARD.DOC

8/16/2007 9:40:19 AM

In the Wisconsin case, the licensed abatement contractor, Harenda
Enterprises, Inc. (HEI), obtained over 325 bulk material samples of the
walls, stairs, and ceiling tiles prior to removal from the Milwaukee
Auditorium.64 HEI had the samples tested by two independent laboratories.65
Although various auditorium materials were determined by the outside
laboratories to exceed one percent asbestos content, the contractor’s
outside testing of the multilayered wall systems fell below one percent
when averaged.66 The multilayered wall system was the central issue in
the 2003 to 2006 civil action. The State’s testing revealed one of the
wall system’s layers contained approximately 1.25 to 2.50% asbestos.67
The State obtained ten additional multilayered wall samples, four of
which had at least one layer that was reported by the outside testing
laboratory to contain more than one percent asbestos.68
The Wisconsin trial court in Harenda Enterprises agreed with the
State that it is “obvious” that the 1990 test method is “not clear.”69 On
that basis, the court elected to give deference to subsequent 1994 and
1995 EPA interpretations of the 1990 test method that effectively
adopted the 1993 test method as the better choice. The Wisconsin trial
court found it noteworthy that both the EPA and NVLAP-certified
laboratories now rely exclusively on the EPA clarifications and the 1993
test method.70 The State argued, “Harenda cannot ignore, and this Court
cannot ignore, the EPA’s plain and simple clarification of its confusing
rule.”71 Wisconsin believed that the application of the 1990 test method
would lead to an “absurd result” because a thin layer of material with
greater than one percent asbestos content would be diluted to less than
one percent content when mathematically combined in a weighted average
approach with a thick layer of non-asbestos-containing material.72
Despite the professed ambiguity of the 1990 test method in the eyes
of both the State and the Harenda Enterprises trial court, the court

64. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 6, State v. Harenda Enters., Inc., 724 N.W.2d
434 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (No. 2005AP1829).
65. Id. at 6.
66. Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 10–11, State v. Harenda Enters., Inc., 724
N.W.2d 434 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (No. 2005AP1829).
67. Id. at 11–12.
68. Id. at 12.
69. Id. at 4, 14–15. The state argued to the court of appeals that “[w]ithout doubt,
the language from the [1990 test method] relied upon by defendant Harenda in making
his argument has led to considerable confusion in the regulated industry.” Id. at 21–22.
70. Id. at 7.
71. Id. at 25.
72. Wisconsin used the example of twelve inches on non-asbestos-containing
styrofoam combined with a quarter inch of plaster containing 5% asbestos. Id. at 22–23.
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nonetheless reached the conclusion that the EPA “clarifications are not
legislative rules” that require rulemaking.73
The SDG&E court concluded just the opposite. The federal court held
that the two EPA “clarifications have the effect of fashioning a new test
method.”74 It ruled that the 1993 test method is a legislative rule requiring
rulemaking procedures and, in the absence of rulemaking procedures,
the test method “may not provide the basis for the Government’s
prosecution.”75 The court concluded that the indictment therefore failed
to allege all essential elements of the offense and dismissed all NESHAP
work practice counts.76
IV. HISTORY OF THE EPA’S ASBESTOS NESHAP REGULATION
A. Asbestos Federally Regulated by Patchwork of
Statutes and Regulations
Asbestos is a naturally occurring mineral used for many decades in
construction materials because of attributes such as heat resistance,
durability, and tensile strength.77 Asbestos use is regulated by an incongruous
array of federal statutes and regulations. The Occupational Safety &
Health Act of 1970, for example, regulates asbestos worker exposure.78
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 regulates mine worker
asbestos exposure.79 TSCA regulates the commercial elimination of
asbestos products and mandates asbestos warnings and removal actions
in schools.80 The CAA, in contrast, regulates asbestos emissions during
manufacturing and the removal of certain asbestos-containing materials
during “demolitions” or “renovations.” Under the 1970 CAA amendments,
the EPA began to regulate asbestos emissions during manufacturing
operations, product applications, and demolition activities in 1973.81

73. Id. at 8.
74. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 12:7–8.
75. Id. at 12:26–13:2.
76. Id. at 14–17.
77. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th Cir. 1991).
78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2000).
79. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–962 (2000).
80. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641–2656 (2000).
81. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos, Beryllium,
and Mercury, 38 Fed. Reg. 8826 (Apr. 6, 1973).
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B. The Clean Air Act
The genesis of the modern Clean Air Act dates back to the 1950s.82
The Act has been amended and expanded more than ten times.83 The
1970 CAA amendments authorized the EPA to identify and regulate
“hazardous air pollutants” or HAPs.84 For the next twenty years, until
the 1990 CAA amendments, the EPA identified only eight hazardous air
pollutants through rulemaking alone.85 Naturally occurring asbestos was
the first of three hazardous air pollutants identified by the EPA in 1971,
along with beryllium and mercury.86 The EPA promulgated its first
asbestos NESHAP regulation (less than two pages in length) in 1973.87
The NESHAP has been substantively amended four times.88
82. Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (providing
federal research and technical assistance to states to develop their own air quality
standards).
83. The major clean air legislation and amendments thereto include the following:
Clean Air Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399; Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685; Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84
Stat. 1676; Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485; Motor Vehicle Air
Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992; Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L.
No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (amended for additional funding for state air quality research
programs in 1965, 1966, 1967, and 1969); Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L.
No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322.
84. Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, § 112.
85. EPA listed the following eight hazardous air pollutants through rulemaking
before the 1990 congressionally mandated list of 189 in the 1990 Clean Air Act:
(1) asbestos, 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (Mar. 31, 1971); (2) beryllium, 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (Mar.
31, 1971); (3) mercury, 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (Mar. 31, 1971); (4) vinyl chloride, 40 Fed.
Reg. 59,532 (Dec. 24, 1975); (5) benzene, 42 Fed. Reg. 29,332 (June 8, 1977);
(6) radionuclides, 44 Fed. Reg. 76,738 (Dec. 27, 1979); (7) inorganic arsenic, 45 Fed.
Reg. 37,886 (June 5, 1980); and (8) coke oven emissions, 49 Fed. Reg. 36,560 (Sept. 18,
1984).
86. Air Pollution Prevention and Control; List of Hazardous Air Pollutants,
36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (Mar. 31, 1971).
87. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos,
Beryllium, and Mercury, 38 Fed. Reg. 8826, 8829–30 (Apr. 6, 1973). The asbestos
NESHAP was repromulgated at 40 C.F.R. subpt. M in 1984 after Adamo Wrecking Co.
v. United States. 434 U.S. 275 (1978). In Adamo, the Supreme Court invalidated the
asbestos NESHAP work practices as being unauthorized by the 1970 CAA and an
erroneous EPA extrapolation of its own authority under then-existing legislation that had
been later cured in subsequent amendments to the CAA. See National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Amendments to Asbestos Standard, 49 Fed.
Reg. 13,658 (Apr. 5, 1984).
88. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Amendments to
Standards for Asbestos and Mercury, 40 Fed. Reg. 48,292 (Oct. 14, 1975); National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Amendments to Asbestos Standard, 49
Fed. Reg. 13,658 (Apr. 5, 1984); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406 (Nov. 20, 1990). The
1994 amendments added an EPA “Interpretative Rule Governing Roof Removal
Operations” authorizing, among other things, mechanical removal of roofing materials
using a “rotating blade (RB) roof cutter,” 40 C.F.R. pt. 61, subpt. M, app. A.
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Under the 1990 CAA amendments, Congress dramatically expanded
the list of hazardous air pollutants beyond the eight identified through
slow EPA rulemaking between 1970 and 1990. Congress unilaterally
listed 189 hazardous air pollutants in the CAA itself and delegated to the
EPA the task of framing emission standards regulations for each.
Congress directed that the EPA “shall promulgate regulations establishing
emission standards” to achieve the “maximum degree of reduction in
emissions of the [listed] hazardous air pollutants” taking into consideration,
among other things, the “cost of achieving such emission reduction,”
non-air impacts, and energy requirements.89 The EPA is required to review,
and revise as necessary, the respective NESHAP emission standards not
less than every eight years.90 The last major revision to the asbestos
NESHAP took place seventeen years ago in 1990.
C. Evolution of the Asbestos NESHAP Regulation
The asbestos NESHAP (now set forth at 40 C.F.R. subpart M) is an
EPA regulation with roots in both the 1970 CAA and the 1976 Toxic
Substances Control Act.91 The asbestos NESHAP bridges Congress’s
mandate under the 1970 CAA to develop emission standards for hazardous
air pollutants and the TSCA’s goal of eliminating asbestos-containing
products from commerce and schools.92 In fact, the 1990 test method to
quantify asbestos under the NESHAP was enacted originally into law
through TSCA rulemaking in 1982, which required school authorities to

89. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1), (d)(2) (2000).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1) (2000).
91. A chronology of the asbestos NESHAP is attached as Appendix A. In general,
NESHAP regulations can pertain either to specific HAPs, or manufacturing processes or
“source categories” that emit HAPs as a by-product. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pts. 61, 63 (2006).
Part 61 contains twenty-two NESHAP regulations for uranium mining, beryllium, beryllium
rocket motors, mercury, vinyl chloride, radionuclides, benzene, phosphorous plants,
asbestos, arsenic emissions from copper smelter and glass manufacturing plants, and
radon. 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.01–.359 (2006). Part 63 applies to a wide array of manufacturing
processes, including, for example, shipbuilding and repair of pleasure craft. 40 C.F.R.
§§ 63.5680–.5779 (2006). There are at least ninety-two NESHAP regulations. See
Thirteen EPA Rules Limiting Emissions of Toxics from Industrial Sites Announced, BNA
DAILY ENV’T REP. NO. 167, at A-3 (2003).
92. See Toxic Substances Control Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (2000); see also
Asbestos: Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions;
Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,468 (July 12, 1989) (describing three-stage ban of
approximately 94% of all commercial asbestos products under TSCA; banning asbestoscontaining pipewrap effective August 27, 1990).
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inspect and identify friable asbestos in schools.93 That test method was
readopted in 1987 under rulemaking to implement the Asbestos Hazard
Emergency Response Act of 1986 (AHERA), legislation that amended and
expanded TSCA. The 1990 test method was later explicitly incorporated
into the asbestos NESHAP and the definition of asbestos-containing
material in 1990 as part of the last major revisions to the CAA regulation.94
The 1990 test method remains today the only test authorized by law to
quantify asbestos in material for purposes of the asbestos NESHAP.
The asbestos NESHAP evolved most dramatically during its first seventeen
years, and has remained fairly static since the 1990 amendments. The
original 1973 asbestos NESHAP regulation started very modestly.95 It
mandated three to four basic “procedures” to remove friable material
before “demolition” of buildings to limit the extent of “emissions of
particulate asbestos material to outside air.”96
The concept of friability was left completely undefined until 1975, at
which time the EPA amended the NESHAP regulation to define “friable
asbestos material” as “any material that contains more than 1 percent
asbestos by weight and that can be crumbled, pulverized, or reduced to
powder, when dry, by hand pressure.”97 In defining friability in 1975,
the agency reasoned that:
EPA’s intention was to distinguish between materials that would readily release
asbestos fibers when damaged or disturbed and those materials that were
unlikely to result in the release of significant amounts of asbestos fibers. To
accomplish this, EPA labeled as “friable” those materials that were likely to
readily release fibers.98

The EPA stated that the intent of the 1975 NESHAP amendments and its
definition of friability “is not to control handling of vinyl-asbestos floor
tile, asbestos felt roofing, or other similar materials, since it is the
Administrator’s judgment that such activities will not release asbestos in
93. See Friable Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools; Identification and
Notification, 47 Fed. Reg. 23,360, 23,376 (May 27, 1982).
94. Id. (original TSCA 1982 test method); Asbestos-Containing Materials in
Schools; Final Rule and Notice, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,826, 41,837 (Oct. 30, 1987) (stating in
1987 that the existing 1982 TSCA test method is “sufficient” for AHERA purposes);
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP Revision;
Final Rule, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406, 48,410 (Nov. 20, 1990) (incorporating 1987 AHERA
test method into 1990 asbestos NESHAP amendments). Thus, the test methods under
TSCA (1982), AHERA (1987) and the asbestos NESHAP (1990) are identical.
95. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos, Beryllium,
and Mercury, 38 Fed. Reg. 8826, 8829–30 (Apr. 6, 1973).
96. Id. at 8829 (no “visible emissions” allowed to outside air).
97. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos and
Mercury, 40 Fed. Reg. 48,292, 48,299 (Oct. 14, 1975) (emphasis added).
98. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP
Revision; Final Rule, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406, 48,408 (Nov. 20, 1990).
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a manner which is dangerous to human health.”99 The EPA also recognized
for many years that the hand pressure field test for determining friability
is “somewhat subjective.”100 However, no objective measure for determining
friability had yet been developed. The EPA deemed the human hand
pressure test adequate for “most materials.”101 The NESHAP rule also was
amended in 1975 to include renovation projects, another perceived
major source of asbestos fiber emissions.102
The asbestos NESHAP regulation was next amended in 1984.
Essentially, the work practices were repromulgated in 1984 after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,103
which determined that the work practices were not then explicitly authorized
by an earlier version of the CAA.104 Major substantive NESHAP
changes would take place in 1990, certain of which were the genesis of
the SDG&E criminal and Harenda Enterprises civil cases. Indeed, most
criminal asbestos NESHAP prosecutions postdate the 1990 amendments
to the regulation.105
D. 1990 Asbestos NESHAP Amendments
In January 1989, the EPA commenced nearly two years of CAA
rulemaking that led to major revisions in the asbestos NESHAP because
of the “overwhelming consensus among enforcement officials and
industry groups that there is a significant level of noncompliance and
confusion with the NESHAP.”106 For example, in 1990, the EPA first
99. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF AIR & WASTE MGMT., EPA-450/2-74009A, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS
AIR POLLUTANTS—PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO STANDARDS FOR ASBESTOS AND
MERCURY 16 (1974).
100. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 4-11.
101. Id.
102. Amendments to Standards for Asbestos and Mercury, 40 Fed. Reg. 48,292,
48,299 (Oct. 14, 1975). “Demolition” requires the “wrecking or taking out of any loadsupporting structural member.” 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2006). In 1994, the EPA construed
the removal of underground pipes as “renovation” activity because of the absence of a
“load-bearing” component for underground pipes. See EPA-Clean Air Act Applicability
Determination Index, Control No. A960010, http://cfpub.epa.gov/adi/index.cfm?CFID=
(click on “Search by Document Control Number” hyperlink, select “A960010” from list,
select “Display/Submit Query,” select “Submit Query,” and select “A960010” hyperlink).
103. 434 U.S. 275 (1978).
104. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Amendments to
Asbestos Standard, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,658, 13,658–65 (Apr. 5, 1984).
105. See supra note 21.
106. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 3-1.
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defined the concepts of “Category I” and “Category II” nonfriable,
asbestos-containing materials (ACM) to help separate lower-risk and
higher-risk asbestos-containing materials.107 “EPA has been able to compile
a list of nonfriable ACM that, under normal conditions, do not have to
be removed prior to demolition operations. These ACM [Category I
materials] are not expected to release significant amounts of asbestos
fibers to the outside air during demolition . . . .”108
Today there are four Category I materials that “under normal
conditions, do not have to be removed prior to demolition operations”
because the EPA believes they pose a lower risk of releasing fibers into
the air during demolition or renovation operations.109 The four materials
are (i) resilient floor covering; (ii) asphalt roofing products; (iii) gaskets;
and (iv) packings. Anything not expressly identified as Category I is, by
definition, Category II material.110 Multilayered, coal tar pipe wrap like
that in the SDG&E case is not included in the enumerated list of
Category I materials, and therefore constitutes Category II material,
although the EPA equivocated on this basic issue.111
The 1990 NESHAP amendments moved away from the original 1973
weight-based standard to determine asbestos quantity in materials (1%
by weight) to more of a two-dimensional area-based standard (1% by
area) for single-layered material. The EPA did not specify how to average
the layer-specific results for multilayered material (for example, average
by volume or weight of the layers). The EPA also decided it was “long
overdue” to adopt a specific test method to determine asbestos content to
“reduce confusion over what activities are subject to the regulation.”112
However, the EPA recognized that a promulgated test method would
carry heavy agency obligations:

107. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP
Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406, 48,409 (Nov. 20, 1990); accord U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, supra note 18, at 7-110.
108. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP
Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. at 48,409.
109. Id.
110. 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2006) (definitions).
111. The Bill of Particulars in SDG&E devotes four pages to the government’s
ongoing and profound contradictions on whether coal tar pipe coating is Category I or II
material. Government Bill of Particulars, supra note 10, at 2–6. Various EPA letters
also take inconsistent positions regarding whether the pipe wrap is Category I or
Category II. In 1992, the EPA described pipe wrap coating as “Category II nonfriable
ACM.” See Letter from John B. Rasnic, Dir. of EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards, to Williams Pipe Line Co. (May 22, 1992) (on file with authors). The EPA
Region 9 inspector also took inconsistent positions on whether the coating is Category I
or II material during the course of the SDG&E matter.
112. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 4-8.
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One advantage to including the analytical method for the identification and
quantification of asbestos directly in the NESHAP is that the method is then
readily available to those who have an interest in the asbestos NESHAP. A
disadvantage of this approach is that, when the analytical method is revised as
a result of improvements in methodology, the analytical method contained in the
NESHAP cannot be changed without going through lengthy and timeconsuming procedures to amend the regulation. . . . The EPA believes that, by
including the analytical method used to determine asbestos content in the
definition, future misinterpretation of the definition is unlikely.113

The EPA ultimately decided to incorporate the preexisting test method
from TSCA (1982) and AHERA (1987) into the asbestos NESHAP
regulation (1990). The EPA’s decision meant that the asbestos NESHAP
test method would change automatically with any test method updates
promulgated under TSCA or AHERA, without mandating separate CAA
rulemaking to keep the asbestos test method uniform and consistent
under TSCA, AHERA, and the CAA. The EPA recognized as early as 1990
that the enumerated test method adopted into the 1990 NESHAP was
virtually “locked in place” until such time as either (1) the asbestos
NESHAP regulation was amended to adopt a new or unique asbestos
NESHAP test method, or (2) the TSCA/AHERA test method regulation
(incorporated by reference into the asbestos NESHAP and the definition
of RACM) was amended. Notably, this did not occur: RACM’s definition
and its governing test method have never been changed since 1990.114
The existing NESHAP regulation definition states RACM must
contain “more than 1 percent asbestos as determined using the method
specified in [TSCA/AHERA] appendix E, subpart E, 40 CFR part 763,
section 1, Polarized Light Microscopy.”115 As indicated by this language,
the NESHAP regulation cross-references to a non-CAA, AHERA regulation.
Specifically, the 1990 test method incorporated by reference into the
NESHAP is outlined in fifteen pages of the AHERA regulation for
schools and public buildings.116

113. Id. at 4-16 (emphasis added).
114. Id. The EPA notes the downside to adopting a test method in a NESHAP
regulation is that when test improvements became available, the NESHAP test method
“cannot be changed without going through lengthy and time-consuming procedures to
amend the regulation.” Id.
115. 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2006) (definitions) (emphasis added).
116. 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E (2006).
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E. 1990 Asbestos NESHAP Work Practices
The asbestos NESHAP does not establish any maximum level of
asbestos fibers that may be released in the air during removal activities.
In 1975, the EPA explained that the omission resulted from the fact that
analytical test methods for airborne asbestos were relatively inaccurate at
the time, and geographically diffuse, urban demolitions and renovations did
not easily lend themselves to a precise and workable point to monitor
total asbestos emissions.
Congress has specified that EPA should set emission standards for hazardous air
pollutants. EPA, charged with implementing this requirement, has determined
that the term “emission standard” includes work practice requirements designed
to limit emissions. . . . These methods of control are required because of the
impossibility at this time of prescribing and enforcing allowable numerical
concentrations or mass emissions limitations. One difficulty in prescribing a
numerical emission standard is the relative inaccuracy of asbestos analytical
methods.117

Fifteen years later, in response to public comments supporting
numerical asbestos emission standards and as part of the 1990 NESHAP
amendments, the EPA balked again because it was still “not aware that
methods of measuring asbestos concentrations in ambient air [were]
available at an acceptable cost for routine monitoring purposes.”118
As a concession to practicality and cost, the EPA decided to control
emissions of specific forms of asbestos fibers119 indirectly through
“work practices” rather than numerical emission standards. The number
of applicable NESHAP work practices can vary depending on the
project, but generally comprise less than one dozen possible low-tech
field measures that have the practical effect in the EPA’s eyes of limiting
or minimizing asbestos fiber releases into the ambient air. The EPA is
the first to acknowledge that these work practices are not designed to
guarantee or achieve zero asbestos fiber emissions; rather, the EPA

117. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Amendments to
Standards for Asbestos and Mercury, 40 Fed. Reg. 48,292, 48,296 (Oct. 14, 1975)
(emphasis added).
118. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 7-110 (emphasis added).
119. Asbestos means “asbestiform varieties of serpentine (chrysotile), riebeckite
(crocidolite), cummingtonite-grunerite, anthrophyllite, and actinolite-tremolite.” 40
C.F.R. § 61.141 (2006). In the high profile criminal case of United States v. W.R. Grace,
the court excluded all Libby, Montana asbestos data that pertained to species of asbestos
that fell outside the enumerated NESHAP definition. 455 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (D. Mont.
2006) (No. CR 05-07-M-DWM), appeal docketed, No. 06-30472 (9th Cir. Sept. 5,
2006). See Order, supra note 24. That exclusionary order is now on appeal to the Ninth
Circuit.
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envisions that the work practices simply limit asbestos emissions to an
acceptable level.120
Following the 1990 NESHAP amendments, and depending on the
specific project, the generally applicable work practices for RACM are
set forth below:
No.

ASBESTOS NESHAP WORK PRACTICES

1.

Written Notification to Agency of Intention to
Demolish/Renovate Covered Facility Ten Working Days
Prior to Commencement of Activities
40 C.F.R. § 61.145(a)(2), 61.145(a)(4), 61.145(b) (2006)

2.

Remove “Regulated” ACM Before Material is Disturbed
40 C.F.R. § 61.145(c)(1) (2006)

3.

Competent Person Trained in Asbestos NESHAP
Regulation On-Site to Supervise “Regulated” ACM
Removal (40-hour course)
40 C.F.R. § 61.145(c)(8) (2006)

4.

“Regulated” ACM “Adequately Wet” Until Collected
During Removal or Demolition, or Negative Pressure
Enclosure if Wetting Unavailable
40 C.F.R. § 61.145(c)(3), (c)(6), (c)(9) (2006)

5.

Seal “Regulated” ACM While Wet in Leak-Tight
Containers with OSHA Labels
40 C.F.R. § 61.150(a)(1)(iii) (2006)

6.

Leak-Tight Wrapping for Removed “Regulated” ACM
40 C.F.R. § 61.145(c)(3), (c)(4) (2006)

120. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF AIR & WATER PROGRAMS, APTD-1503,
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS
FOR HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS: ASBESTOS, BERYLLIUM, AND MERCURY 26 (1973).
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ASBESTOS NESHAP WORK PRACTICES
Deposit “Regulated” ACM at Licensed Disposal Site
40 C.F.R. § 61.150(b) (2006)

As explained by the Supreme Court in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United
States,121 the EPA chose to regulate asbestos fibers released into the air
indirectly through work practices where the agency felt it could not
feasibly regulate actual emissions. In response to the Supreme Court’s
1978 ruling vacating a criminal NESHAP asbestos work practices case
in Adamo Wrecking Co., the CAA now explicitly authorizes the EPA to
adopt work practices “if it is not feasible in the judgment of the
Administrator to prescribe or enforce an emission standard for control of
a hazardous air pollutant.”122 In the EPA’s view, the policy goal of
“vindicating the work practices” is more important than demonstrating
conclusively through actual air monitoring that no releases of asbestos
fibers occurred in real time. The futility of wetting a water-repellant
coal tar or the real possibility that wetting might be less effective than
eliminating actual emissions are equally beside the point and irrelevant
to the EPA under the existing regulation.
F. Three Jurisdictional Elements for Asbestos-Containing
Material to be “Regulated” and Subject to Work
Practices under the 1990 NESHAP Amendments
Not all materials containing asbestos, and not all demolition and
renovation projects, are regulated. The material and project must, among
other things, exceed certain thresholds regarding project size and asbestos
content. “Regulated” material is broader by definition than friable material
alone. In addition to friable material, RACM may include presently nonfriable
material that will be subject to certain future acts of disturbance. Under
all circumstances, however, to be regulated, the government must
demonstrate three elements.123 An analytical roadmap of the asbestos
NESHAP is attached as Appendix B.
a. PROJECT QUANTITY THRESHOLD: The amount of asbestoscontaining material to be removed during the project must exceed
a minimum threshold: (i) 260 linear feet on pipes; (ii) 160 square

121.
122.
123.
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434 U.S. 275, 286–87 (1978).
42 U.S.C. § 7412(h)(1) (2000).
See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 6:11–21.
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feet on other facility components; or (iii) 35 cubic feet where length
or area cannot be measured.124 The size of the project is thus a
jurisdictional predicate for the NESHAP regulation.
b. PERCENT THRESHOLD OF ASBESTOS IN MATERIAL: The
quantity of asbestos fibers in the material must exceed 1% as
determined by the 1990 test method (or the identical 1982 TSCA or
1987 AHERA test method) only.125 The quantity of asbestos in the
material is thus a jurisdictional predicate for the NESHAP
regulation.
c. REMOVAL PROCESS INVOLVES FRIABLE MATERIAL OR
PROCESS RENDERS, OR IS LIKELY TO RENDER, CATEGORY I OR
CATEGORY II, NONFRIABLE, ASBESTOS-CONTAINING MATERIAL
FRIABLE: Since 1990, the asbestos NESHAP now divides the universe
of nonfriable asbestos-containing materials into the mutually
exclusive groups of Category I or Category II material. Asbestoscontaining material becomes “regulated” (assuming it exceeds the
project size and percentage jurisdictional thresholds noted above)
under four possible circumstances:
(1) The material already is in friable126 condition, pre-disturbance;
(2) The four enumerated Category I nonfriable, asbestos-containing
materials become friable during removal or disturbance;
(3) The four enumerated Category I nonfriable, asbestos-containing
materials will be, or have been, subject to the following acts
of disturbance: “sanding,” “grinding,” “cutting,” or “abrading”; or
(4) The remaining universe of Category II nonfriable, asbestoscontaining materials have a “high probability” of becoming
“crumbled, pulverized or reduced to powder” (that is, friable)
by the “forces expected to act on the material in the course of
demolition or renovation operations.”127

124. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.145(a) (2006).
125. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2006) (defining “friable” and “nonfriable” asbestoscontaining materials) (emphasis added); 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E, § 1 (2006).
126. “Friable asbestos material means any material containing more than 1 percent
asbestos as determined using [the 1990 test method/1987 AHERA test method] specified
in appendix E, subpart E, 40 CFR part 763, section 1 . . . that, when dry, can be
crumbled, pulverized, or reduced to powder by hand pressure.” 40 C.F.R. § 61.141
(2006) (emphasis added).
127. Id. (defining “regulated asbestos-containing material”).
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The SDG&E court held that it was not enough for the government to
allege project size only in an indictment and disregard other elements,
such as percentage content and the Category I or II nature of the
material.128
G. Major Substantive Distinctions Exist Between the NESHAP 1990
Test Method and the EPA 1993 Test Method
There are at least five substantive differences between the 1990 and
1993 test methods. Of paramount importance, the 1990 test method,
which mandates the analysis and averaging of all layers of multilayered
material, has been through federal rulemaking three times. In contrast,
the 1993 test method rejects basic tenets of the 1990 test method (averaging)
and has never been through federal rulemaking.129 In addition to the
obvious disparity in legal standing and rules of quantification, the differences
extend to the size of reliable samples and laboratory determinations of
friability, a unique feature of the 1993 test method. These incompatible
approaches and definitions profoundly affect what is considered
“regulated,” and therefore what actions are subject to prosecution.
Whereas the 1990 test method mandates “representative,” multilayered
samples to quantify asbestos content layer-by-layer, the 1993 test
method deems material to be “regulated” if any single layer (or portion
thereof) contains over 1% asbestos. As applied by the EPA laboratory in
the SDG&E case, for example, the 1993 test method purports to
characterize the asbestos content of 9.23 miles of pipe coating on the
weight of a “1 millimeter piece” of any single layer of the coating. In
fact, the government represented in SDG&E that, for purposes of
demonstrating a crime, a “one gram [0.035 ounce] sample of material is
more than sufficient to perform the necessary testing to determine a [sic]
whether a violation of the Clean Air Act has occurred.”130 Even the
EPA has flatly disagreed with this position outside the 2006 SDG&E
prosecution. The 1993 test method starts from the premise that a
“sample should be of sufficient size to provide for an adequate
examination.”131 “Generally, samples of insufficient volume should be

128. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 14–17.
129. Various states have adopted the EPA’s recommended 1993 test method
following proper rulemaking procedures. New Jersey even issued emergency rules in
June 2006 adopting the 1993 test method for purposes of its own state asbestos laws. 38
N.J. Reg. 2526–29 (June 5, 2006).
130. Letter from Melanie K. Pierson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to Gregory A. Vega et al. (July 18, 2006) (on file with authors).
131. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 17, at 3.
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rejected and further analysis curtailed . . .” because it adversely affects
reliability.132
For pipe wrap, the 1993 test method recommends a minimum of three
to four square inches of all layered material.133 The EPA’s 1993 test
method considers anything less than fifteen grams for a single sample to
be a “small quantity” bulk sample requiring special precautions to avert
rejection for unreliability.134
The 1990 test method also stands in stark contrast to the EPA’s
nonpromulgated 1993 test method because the binding method makes no
laboratory determination of friability, as a predictor of the material’s
actual condition in the field. Under the asbestos NESHAP, friability
determinations are reserved to accredited or certified experts inspecting
the original material in the field. A material’s condition in the field is
not necessarily representative of the condition of a sample in the
laboratory one day or, as in the SDG&E case, five to six years later.135
Laboratories analyze bulk samples under the 1990 test method for two
limited purposes: (1) to determine asbestos content, and (2) to identify
the type of any asbestos fiber that is present. The fact that various
laboratories now go much further and purport to report on the friable or
nonfriable condition of the bulk samples underscores that the 1993 test
method is now routinely applied.
Unlike the 1990 test method, the newer 1993 test method requires
laboratories to report on friability, as that term is separately defined in
the nonbinding 1993 test method itself. According to the 1993 test
method, and in stark contrast to the NESHAP’s 1990 test method,
laboratories examine “bulk building material” samples for the following:

132. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id. at app. C, C-3.
135. In the SDG&E case, the EPA first tested coating material removed in 2001 in
2006, after that material was used as “training aids” by an EPA inspector. The material
was tested again in 2007 in an effort to comply with the 1990 test method after dismissal
of the original indictment. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9.
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[H]omogeneity, texture, friability, color, and the extent of fibrous components
of the sample. . . . Friability may be indicated by the ease with which the
sample is disaggregated (see definitions in Appendix A) as received by the
analyst. This does not necessarily represent the friability of the material as
determined by the assessor at the collection site.136

The 1993 test method’s definition of friability differs substantively
from the asbestos NESHAP’s definition, thereby exacerbating the
constitutional dilemma of prosecutions based on the nonbinding test.137
Thus, when a laboratory reports a bulk sample as “friable” under the
nonbinding 1993 test method, that description is not necessarily the
same thing as “friable” under the NESHAP regulation. According to
Appendix A of the 1993 test method, friability “[r]efers to the cohesiveness
of a bulk material, indicating that it may be crumbled or disaggregated
by hand pressure,”138 which is nothing more than a subjective and
predictive assessment by a laboratory analyst with the aid of instruments
of what might actually happen in the field with hand forces and sufficient
material, but without actually being in the field. Laboratory technicians
are called upon by the nonbinding method to predict vicariously from a
small, one-millimeter piece of material, using laboratory instruments and
a microscope, whether the original intact material (assuming sufficient
quantity) may be capable of being crumbled by humans in the field
with hand pressure while the material is dry. It is indisputable that the
nonbinding 1993 test method definition differs from the NESHAP’s
field-test definition of friability.
One of the nongovernmental laboratories in the SDG&E case explained
in the parallel state civil case, People v. Sempra Energy, that the laboratory
reported on friability in all of its reports to maintain its NVLAP
accreditation.139 The laboratory also explained that the definition of
friability for purposes of the 1993 test method is broader and not congruent
with the competing definition set forth in the asbestos NESHAP

136. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 17, at 6 (emphasis added).
137. 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 defines “friable asbestos material” as any material
(1) containing more than 1 percent asbestos, (2) as determined by the 1990 test method,
that (3) “when dry, can be crumbled, pulverized, or reduced to powder by hand
pressure.” For purposes of the 1993 test method, friable refers to the “cohesiveness of a
bulk material, indicating that it may be crumbled or disaggregated by hand pressure.”
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 17, at app. A (Glossary of Terms), A-3
(emphasis added).
138. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 17, at A-3 (emphasis added).
139. See Deposition of Virginia Shefa at 117:1–12, People v. Sempra Energy, No.
GIE028660 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2005).
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regulation.140 In the laboratory, an analyst uses a pick to break apart a
piece of material under a microscope to evaluate friability.141
Taken to its logical extreme, friability under the 1993 test method
encompasses the universe of material that can be “crumbled” by a lab
instrument (for example, paper) or “disaggregated” (for example, charcoal
or dirt). It does not even necessarily relate to asbestos-containing
material or, more specifically, asbestos-containing material containing
more than 1% asbestos, as set forth explicitly in the asbestos NESHAP
definition. Accordingly, under the looser definition of the 1993 test
method, it is conceivable for a laboratory to report material as friable
that contains trace or no asbestos fibers whatsoever. The broader and
purely subjective definition of friability under the 1993 test method
further operates to expand without rulemaking the regulatory definitions
for both “friable” and “regulated asbestos-containing material.” Even if
the government was free to substitute the nonbinding 1993 test method
(or any other jurisdictional test method of choice) into the NESHAP
regulation and RACM’s definition outside rulemaking, which it cannot,
the inconsistent test methods and definitions of key NESHAP concepts
in the 1993 test method operate to blur the jurisdictional dividing line
between regulated and nonregulated material and, in so doing, entirely
lawful conduct.
1. Post-1993 EPA Clarifications to the 1990 NESHAP Test Method
After circulating its nonbinding test method to the nation’s laboratories in
September 1993, the EPA twice purported to “clarify” (in 1994 and 1995)
that the NESHAP’s 1990 test method did not mean what it literally said.
On August 1, 1994, the EPA issued an advisory in the Federal Register of
the “availability of an improved” 1993 test method that would avoid
underreporting for asbestos content in multilayered material.142 Notably,
the agency took no steps necessary to make the 1993 test method binding
law. The EPA reported that its first clarification in 1994 was necessary
to answer “many questions” regarding the 1990 test method.143 While
disclaiming that the 1994 clarification in any way replaced the existing
140. Id. at 220:3–14.
141. Id.
142. Advisory Regarding Availability of an Improved Asbestos Bulk Sample
Analysis Test Method, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,970 (Aug. 1, 1994).
143. Asbestos NESHAP Clarifications Regarding Analysis of Multi-Layered Systems,
59 Fed. Reg. 542 (Jan. 5, 1994).
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asbestos NESHAP 1990 test method, the EPA advised that “when a
sample consists of two or more distinct layers or materials, each layer
should be treated separately and the results reported by layer (discrete
stratum).”144 The “results of the analysis of those individual layers of
‘add-on’ material may not be averaged . . . .”145 If any add-on
material exceeds 1%, the entire “project would be subject to the asbestos
NESHAP.”146
One month following its first clarification, the EPA published an
Asbestos Sampling Bulletin to educate the public on its new policy
direction.147 The EPA claimed that its public outreach bulletin did not
change the law, but it was merely designed to “clarify” multilayered
material testing and “build[] on” the 1990 test method. Such an outreach
was required, according to the EPA, because of ongoing “misidentification”
of multilayered materials as nonregulated under the literal language of
the 1990 test method as a result of averaging.148
Two years after the first agency clarification of the 1990 test method
for multilayered materials, the EPA felt compelled to publish a second
clarification in 1995 to address “further questions.”149 The EPA explained
more empathetically on the second occasion that, notwithstanding the
literal language of the NESHAP regulation, the agency’s “unwritten
policy” has long been to disregard multilayered “averaging or dilution.”150
The EPA acknowledged that the literal language of the 1990 test method
has “led to considerable confusion as to how to analyze multi-layered
samples for NESHAP purposes.”151 The EPA was forced to concede in
its December 1995 second clarification that the 1990 test method
required averaging of multilayered materials, which it viewed as
decreasing the asbestos content significantly. But in lieu of subjecting
its new test method to the rigors of rulemaking and judicial review, the
EPA simply reinterpreted the literal language of the 1990 test method in
its second clarification as follows: “If any layer contains greater than one
percent asbestos, that layer must be treated as asbestos-containing. This
will have the effect of requiring all layers in a multi-layered system to be
treated as asbestos-containing.”152 Both the federal government and the
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ASBESTOS SAMPLING BULLETIN, OPPT/CMD 7404
(1994).
148. Id. at 1, 2–3.
149. Asbestos NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of Multi-Layered Systems,
60 Fed. Reg. 65,243 (Dec. 19, 1995).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (emphasis added).
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State of Wisconsin adopted the EPA’s “unwritten policy” against
averaging for purposes of their respective asbestos enforcement programs.
Taking the EPA’s words in its first and second clarifications at face
value, either the 1990 test method as written is vague in the agency’s and
the State of Wisconsin’s eyes, and in need of multiple clarifications, or
the 1990 test method plainly directs an outcome that the EPA and delegated
states strongly dislike as a matter of policy. Either way, erasing elements of
RACM’s definition and the NESHAP test method from the books as
“words of no consequence”153 and resorting to a new test method outside
rulemaking is not a permissible response to bridge the divide between
law and evolving agency policy. On the contrary, it is constitutionally
prohibited and utterly defeats the jurisdictional predicate for enforcement
under the asbestos NESHAP regulation.
True to the EPA’s prediction upon the adoption of the first NESHAP
test method in 1990, the agency acknowledged in 1995 that the NESHAP
regulation would need to be changed through rulemaking to make the
1993 test method legally enforceable. In its 1995 second clarification
about multilayered averaging, the EPA announced that it “intends to
amend the asbestos NESHAP in the near future to refer specifically to
these [1993 test method] procedures.”154 But while the EPA has amended
the rule to correct typographical errors in the 1990 NESHAP amendments155
and has passively witnessed seven states undergo rule changes to the
NESHAP test method, the EPA has taken no CAA rulemaking action
whatsoever to make the 1993 test method new law.
The EPA’s failure to perform the rulemaking required to enforce the
1993 test method contrasts with actions taken by some states, such as
New Jersey. On June 5, 2006, the State of New Jersey enacted “emergency
rules” for the sole purpose of adopting into state law provisions of the
1993 test method.156 Under pre-2006 New Jersey law, no explicit
analytical method had been adopted at the state level to test asbestoscontaining material, and according to the State of New Jersey, its various
153. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140, 149 (1994) (reversing conviction
where element of crime treated as surplusage).
154. Id.
155. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Asbestos,
68 Fed. Reg. 54,790 (Sept. 18, 2003) (providing final rule amending cross-reference
citations to OSHA citations); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
for Asbestos, 69 Fed. Reg. 43,322 (July 20, 2004) (correcting additional typographical
errors).
156. See Testing of Bulk Material Samples, 38 N.J. Reg. 2526(a) (June 5, 2006).
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departments have typically been “utilizing the analytical method which
is recommended, but not required, by the Federal Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) for use in testing bulk materials, namely, the
1993 [test] Method.”157
New Jersey explained that the 1993 test method is preferable to the
1990 test method because the enumerated NESHAP 1990 test method
underreports asbestos content: “[M]ulti-layered samples which may
contain asbestos in a single layer may have been reported by laboratories
as nonasbestos-containing.”158 New Jersey became alarmed that various
private contractors had been removing floor tiles in New Jersey schools
that apparently did not exceed the 1% jurisdictional threshold under the
1990 test method. In response, the state initiated emergency rulemaking
to address the situation where New Jersey contractors could rely lawfully
upon the 1990 test method and its “false-negative results for the presence of
asbestos.”159 New Jersey harshly admonished followers of the 1990 test
method:
These contractors have chosen to adhere to the strict letter of the Federal
regulations, utilizing the less precise 1982 Method [referring to 1982 TSCA or
1990 NESHAP test method] which appears in the Code of Federal Regulations
at 40 CFR Part 763, Appendix E to Subpart E, rather than adopting the state-ofthe-art 1993 [test] Method which is not an official EPA standard, but rather, has
been “recommended” by both EPA’s AHERA program for schools and the EPA
asbestos NESHAP program.160

According to New Jersey, emergency rulemaking was warranted to “establish
unequivocally” that the 1993 test method applies in that state.161 As
New Jersey concluded in 2006, the EPA’s 1993 test method has become
increasingly separated from the NESHAP law. The SDG&E court ruled
that the EPA “clarifications have the effect of fashioning a new test method”
and constitute a nonpromulgated legislative rule.162 The Wisconsin
court of appeals held that the EPA’s clarifications are “at odds with the
clear command” of the 1990 test method and declined to give any
deference to the EPA’s interpretations.163

157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 12.
163. State v. Harenda Enters., Inc., 724 N.W.2d 434, 438–39 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006),
rev. granted, 732 N.W.2d 857 (Wis. 2007).
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2. 1994 Government Accreditation Program Endorsement of the 1993
Test Method for All Laboratories
Deepening the divide between what the NESHAP directs and the EPA
now prefers, the nation’s laboratories promptly heeded the EPA’s two
back-to-back clarifications in 1994 and 1995. Government and private
laboratories are accredited by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) through its
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP).164 At
the direction of NVLAP in 1994, the 1993 test method has incrementally
become today’s de facto test method for national laboratory certification.
The change in standard testing has been well camouflaged.
NVLAP first promulgated standards for asbestos testing in the same
month (August 1994) that the EPA first announced the availability of its
1993 test method in the Federal Register.165 On the one hand, NVLAP
embraced either the 1990 test method or the 1993 test method. On the
other hand, the NVLAP proceeded to direct the nation’s laboratories to
adhere to the newer method. The 1994 NVLAP Handbook states, “The
laboratory shall use the test method contained in the U.S. EPA ‘Interim
Method for the Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Insulation Samples’
[1990 test method] or the current U.S. EPA method for the analysis of
asbestos in building material [1993 test method]. . . . The laboratory is
responsible for ensuring that it implements the latest revision of the
method.”166 To remain certified under government-approved standards,
asbestos testing laboratories nationally have been directed since August
1994 to implement the EPA’s “latest revision of the method,”167 or the
1993 test method.
164. Since 1976, NVLAP has provided third party accreditation services to
government and private laboratories to promote national uniformity and competence.
See C.D. FAISON, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., WHAT IS THE NATIONAL
VOLUNTARY LABORATORY ACCREDITATION PROGRAM (NVLAP)? 1 (2006), available at
http://ts.nist.gov/Standards/upload/What-is-the-NVLAP.pdf. There are 252 national
laboratories accredited under NVLAP for bulk asbestos testing. Id. at Attachment II, 1.
165. See ERIC B. STEEL ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF TECH. HANDBOOK 150-3, NAT’L
VOLUNTARY LAB. ACCREDITATION PROGRAM: BULK ASBESTOS ANALYSIS (1994).
166. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
167. The 1994 NVLAP Asbestos Handbook expressly and repeatedly cites the 1993
test method as authority for its accreditation program. See id. at 1. The NVLAP
Asbestos Handbook also adopts the 1993 test method’s definition of friable verbatim, not
NESHAP’s definition of friable. Compare id. at 2 (providing that friable “refers to the
cohesiveness of a bulk material, indicating that it may be crumbled or disaggregated by
hand pressure”), with 40 CFR § 61.141 (2006) (defining “friable asbestos material” as
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The EPA and NVLAP jointly have promoted the application of the
1993 test method for over ten years, effectively rewriting the definition
of RACM and expanding the EPA’s jurisdiction outside rulemaking. In
contrast, NVLAP’s own scope of accreditation states that laboratories
are accredited for asbestos bulk sample analysis under the “Interim
Method for the Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Insulation Samples”
as published by the EPA’s Environmental Monitoring Systems Laboratory
in December 1982 (EPA-600/M4-82-020). NVLAP erroneously believes
that EPA-600/M4-82-020 is identical in all respects to the promulgated
test method.168 It is not. In 2007, there are up to three different test methods
all being marketed by either NVLAP or the EPA as the appropriate
asbestos test method for any and all purposes, including criminal prosecution.
Despite the EPA’s promise in 1995 of forthcoming rulemaking to
subject its 1993 test method to public comment and judicial review, and
the frustration of multiple states concerning the literal language of the
NESHAP standard, the EPA has never amended the regulation to
modify or supersede the 1990 test method that it twice felt compelled to
clarify as either vague, or clear but undesirable. In its petition for review
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the State took the position that the
1990 test method is “confusing” and “unclearly written,” and the EPA’s
1994 and 1995 clarifications legally fill that void.169 In SDG&E, the
EPA took the opposite position, namely that the 1990 and 1993 tests are
legally and substantively one and the same.170 The EPA also argued that
the particular test method is not a jurisdictional predicate to state an
offense.171 Nonetheless, the EPA has taken no steps to even propose a
NESHAP rule change.
The combination of the government’s post-1994 laboratory accreditation
program promoting the 1993 test method and the EPA’s “unwritten
“any material containing more than 1 percent asbestos . . . that, when dry, can be crumbled,
pulverized, or reduced to powder by hand pressure”).
168. See Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., U.S. EPA–National Enforcement Investigations
Center, http://ts.nist.gov/Standards/scopes/1017030.htm (last visited June 4, 2007). An
added dimension to this conundrum is that the EPA and NVLAP have apparently yet to
discover the discrepancies that exist between the 1990 test method set forth in the
regulation and the EPA-600/M4-82-020 test method. There is a notable difference
between the language set forth in the regulation itself and the EPA 1982 laboratory test
manual upon which NVLAP relies. Specifically, the EPA-600/M4-82-020 test method
that is, on its face, the NVLAP standard of accreditation does not include language
allowing an optional “equivalent estimation method” (as the 1990 test method allows)
and thus requires 400-point counting only.
169. See Petition for Review of a Decision of the Court of Appeals, State v.
Harenda Enters., Inc., 724 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. Nov. 30, 2006), rev. granted, 732 N.W.2d
857 (Wis. 2007).
170. Government’s Response and Opposition to Defendant’s Motions at 48–49,
United States v. San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 06CR0065 DMS (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2006).
171. Id. at 45.
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policy”172 to disregard the 1990 test method has created a due process
conundrum. SDG&E and Harenda Enterprises are the first cases since
the 1990 NESHAP amendments to address the implications of basing
criminal and civil prosecutions upon policy rather than enumerated law.
H. Constitutional and Case Law Analysis
1. Well-Settled Due Process Principles and Interpretative Canons of
Strict Construction of Regulations in Criminal Cases Render
Criminal Prosecutions (and Some Civil Cases) Under the
1993 Test Method Defective
It is well settled that the construction of the asbestos NESHAP
regulation is a question of law.173 The specific test method to quantify
asbestos provides a jurisdictional dividing line between what activity is
lawful and unlawful. The criminal application of a purely discretionary
and nonbinding test method developed after, and outside of, rulemaking
for the asbestos NESHAP violates fundamental principles of due
process, including the doctrine of “fair warning” and the “rule of lenity.”
In 1997, a unanimous Supreme Court instructed that the due process
doctrine of fair warning in criminal cases applies in three contexts:

172. Asbestos NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of Multi-Layered Systems,
60 Fed. Reg. 65,243 (Dec. 19, 1995).
173. In United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp., the Ninth Circuit vacated a fortyfour day civil asbestos NESHAP penalty of up to $1.1 million based on the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation that the regulation allows only a one-day, noncontinuing “notice
violation” of not more than $25,000. 60 F.3d 556 (9th Cir. 1995). Construing the
NESHAP regulation, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, when the “violation of a
regulation subjects private parties to criminal or civil sanctions, a regulation cannot be
construed to mean what an agency intended but did not adequately express.” Id. at 559
(citation omitted). Thus, courts are directed not only to evaluate the jurisdictional
application of the asbestos NESHAP as a question of law, but they must apply ordinary
canons of judicial statutory construction, where the “test is not what [the agency] might
possibly have intended, but what [was] said.” Id. at 559; Order, supra note 24, at 7
(stating that defining asbestos under NESHAP presents a legal question). The Ninth
Circuit has held that the construction of even environmental “permits” issued pursuant to
an environmental regulation presents a question of law. See United States v.
Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1288 (9th Cir. 1993) (sewage treatment plant operating
permit).
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There are three related manifestations of the fair warning requirement. First, the
vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of a “statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” . . .
Second, as a sort of “junior version of the vagueness doctrine,” . . . the canon of
strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by
so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly
covered. . . . Third, although clarity at the requisite level may be supplied by
judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute, . . . due process bars courts from
applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the
statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its
scope.174

Under the rule of lenity, doubts concerning the scope or application of
a criminal statute or regulation are resolved in favor of defendants.175
“The rule of lenity provides that if a court must choose between two
readings of a criminal statute, the court should apply the more lenient
one, leaving it to the legislature to speak in clearer terms if the harsher
alternative is intended.”176 “[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal
penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral
condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define
criminal activity.”177 The reason for lenity lies in the constitutionally
based need for “fair warning.”178 “Because construction of a criminal statute
must be guided by the need for fair warning, it is rare that legislative
history or statutory policies will support a construction of a statute broader
than that clearly warranted by the text.”179
The rule of lenity is particularly appropriate where, as here, the same
conduct is entirely legal in certain circumstances.180 The rule of lenity
and the fair notice doctrine apply equally to statutes and regulations. “If
a violation of a regulation subjects private parties to criminal or civil

174. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (citations omitted).
175. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (applying rule to reverse
criminal tax conviction); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (reversing
firearm conviction because criminal statute vague on jurisdictional “interstate commerce”
predicate for offense); People v. Materne, 72 F.3d 103, 106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[R]ule of
lenity applies where a criminal statute is vague enough to deem both the defendant’s and
the government’s interpretations of it as reasonable.”).
176. United States v. D’Alessio, 822 F. Supp. 1134, 1143 (D.N.J. 1993) (dismissing
six-count indictment based on vague regulations) (citing Bass, 404 U.S. at 347).
177. Bass, 404 U.S. at 348.
178. Id. (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.)).
179. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 (1990). Under the well-settled
canons of statutory construction, courts are deeply reluctant to treat elements of a crime
as surplusage or “words of no consequence.” Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140.
180. United States v. One Big Six Wheel, 987 F. Supp. 169, 181 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(stating that crime is dependent upon specific distance of gambling activity from U.S.
shoreline).
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sanctions, a regulation cannot be construed to mean what an agency
intended but did not adequately express.”181
The rule of lenity and the doctrine of fair warning have recently been
invoked by defendants in 2006 to foreclose the government’s attempt in
a Montana asbestos criminal case to disregard the literal language of the
asbestos NESHAP and expand the definition of asbestos for purposes of
a CAA criminal prosecution.182 In W.R. Grace, the government indicted
a company and seven executives for allegedly putting workers and the
community of Libby, Montana in danger due to the company’s former
mine operations, which had closed in approximately 1992. The indictment
is based in part on the CAA’s prohibition against knowingly releasing
“hazardous air pollutants” that place a person in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury under 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(A).183 The
EPA described the Libby mine as “the nation’s biggest environmental
disaster” and its prosecution as “one of the most significant criminal
indictments for environmental crime in our history.”184 The Department
of Justice called the matter a “human and environmental tragedy.”185
However, the W.R. Grace court ultimately concluded that the government
was prosecuting conduct that was not regulated.
The government was forced to admit that the vast majority of the
asbestos fibers originating from the Libby vermiculite mine (over 90%)
comprised two forms of fibers that fall outside the six enumerated fibers
that define asbestos in the NESHAP.186 As in the SDG&E and Harenda
Enterprises cases, the W.R. Grace defendants sought to hold the
government to the literal language of the NESHAP for purposes of its
181. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 681 F.2d
1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Diamond Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety
and Health Review Comm’n, 528 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir. 1976)); Opinion & Order at 6,
United States v. Apex Oil, No. 95-332-MA (D. Or. Sept. 18, 1996) (“[E]nvironmental
regulation is sufficiently ambiguous when applied to the facts of this case to justify the
application of the rule of lenity.”).
182. See Order, supra note 24.
183. Superseding Indictment, United States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1122,
1128 (D. Mont. 2006) (No. CR 05-07-M-DWM), appeal docketed, No. 06-30472 (9th
Cir. Sept. 5, 2006).
184. Andrew Schneider, W.R. Grace Indictment in Libby Asbestos Deaths, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 8, 2005, at A1.
185. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, W.R. Grace and Executives Charged with
Fraud, Obstruction of Justice, and Endangering Libby, Montana Community (Feb. 7,
2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/February/05_enrd_048.htm (last
visited June 4, 2007).
186. Order, supra note 24, at 3.
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CAA prosecution. As the court noted, however, the “government wants
to ignore the NESHAPs regulations.”187 The government considered the
six-fiber NESHAP definition of asbestos to be undesirable and
inconsequential to the scope of its CAA criminal prosecution.188
The government purported to adopt a broader non-NESHAP definition
of asbestos derived from non-CAA civil cases and regulations for
purposes of its criminal CAA prosecution. Citing Supreme Court and
Ninth Circuit authority, the W.R. Grace court would have none of it.
The court concluded that “the rule of lenity requires that the law be
interpreted to cover only conduct that clearly falls within its scope.”189
The court noted the lack of expert consensus on the basic definition of
asbestos and the ongoing battle of the experts regarding what forms of
fibers comprise regulated asbestos.190 The government’s conundrum
was exacerbated by the fact that it advocated inconsistent definitions of
asbestos that “fail[] to provide the requisite fair warning about what
conduct is considered criminal.”191
The court rejected the government’s proposed substitution of a nonNESHAP definition for asbestos as “ambiguous,” and it applied the rule
of lenity to bar any evidence or government expert testimony at trial
based upon government samples containing forms of asbestos fibers not
clearly within the NESHAP definition. Because a minority of the
asbestos at the Libby mine (less than 10%) included “regulated” forms
of fibers, the case was not dismissed altogether, but significantly altered
nonetheless.192 The government has appealed that ruling, which is
pending before the Ninth Circuit.193
The issue of whether and under what circumstances the government
can expand its jurisdiction to “convert[] some previously lawful conduct
into crimes” was also tested in One Big Six Wheel and adjudicated
against the government because of the rule of lenity.194 In that case, the
government believed a U.S. gambling ship was operating unlawfully in
territorial waters more than three, but less than twelve, nautical miles
from the U.S. shoreline and sought the forfeiture of the ship’s gambling
equipment.195 The Gambling Ship Act (as amended in 1994) authorized
offshore gambling beyond the “territorial waters” of the U.S., which had
187. Id. at 14.
188. Id. at 6.
189. Id. at 9.
190. Id. at 7.
191. Id. at 12.
192. Id. at 21–23.
193. United States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1128 (D. Mont. 2006)
(No. CR 05-07-M-DWM), appeal docketed, No. 06-30472 (9th Cir. Sept. 5, 2006).
194. 987 F. Supp. 169, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
195. Id. at 170.
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been defined by regulation to be three miles from the U.S. shoreline
since at least 1994.196 A separate and subsequent legislation, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, implemented a
“blanket” statutory twelve-mile limit for U.S. territorial waters.197 The
company continued to allow ship-based gambling beyond three miles in
the aftermath of the 1996 statute because twelve miles took too long to
reach.
The One Big Six Wheel court noted that the 1996 antiterrorism statute
did nothing to revoke explicitly the preexisting three-mile regulation for
gambling cruises, leading to internally inconsistent statutory and regulatory
definitions of U.S. territorial waters.198 The court reasoned that it would
not repeal the preexisting three-mile regulation by “implication” and
construed the jurisdictional ambiguity against the government.199 It
stated that “[e]ven if the government is correct in its interpretation, the
path to its conclusion . . . is too serpentine for most readers (including
this court) to follow with any degree of confidence.”200
The rule of lenity squarely applies to the criminal enforcement of
environmental regulations. In United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc.,201 the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a criminal charge
because of ambiguity in the environmental regulation’s definition of the
material prohibited from discharge, “cargo-related oil residues.” The
Apex Oil court applied the rule of lenity to uphold the trial court’s
pretrial dismissal of a count of the indictment alleging conspiracy to
violate the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships and its implementing
regulation at 33 C.F.R. § 151.10(c). The Ninth Circuit stated that the
regulation was “not a model of clarity.”202 It held the regulation too
vaguely defined regarding the precise material prohibited from discharge
and thus criminally unenforceable. “In the face of uncertainty as to the
meaning of what is forbidden, the rule of lenity requires dismissal of
count one of the indictment.”203

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 171–72.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 179 n.11.
Id. at 179.
132 F.3d 1287, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1291.
Id.
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The applicable regulation in Apex Oil and its foundational definition
were amended on the heels of the Ninth Circuit’s 1997 ruling.204 In
SDG&E and W.R. Grace, the government actually sought to render
vague (broader in scope) what is otherwise clearly enumerated in the
1990 NESHAP regulation. The rule of lenity and the related doctrine of
fair notice prohibit the criminal application of nonbinding test methods.
The rule of lenity also applies squarely to criminal prosecutions
involving novel government interpretations of the asbestos NESHAP.205
In United States v. American National Can Co.,206 the EPA sought $1.4
million in civil NESHAP fines against the owner of an abandoned
building that contained pipes and components covered with asbestos.207
The EPA attempted to expand the application of the asbestos NESHAP
to building damage caused by trespassers and scavengers. The EPA
argued that the building owner had failed to follow the NESHAP work
practices for renovations and vicariously attributed liability to the
property owner for the conduct of trespassers and scavengers. The court
was so offended by the EPA’s misapplication of the clear language of
the asbestos NESHAP that it granted the company summary judgment as
a matter of law and ordered the government to pay the company’s
attorneys’ fees.208

204. In a criminal case seven years after Apex involving a cargo ship’s discharge of
442 metric tons of diesel-contaminated wheat and diesel fuel into the ocean, a Florida
court declined to dismiss charges under the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships or apply
the rule of lenity. See United States v. Stickle, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
Not only had the defective regulation at 33 C.F.R. § 151.10(c) been amended after the
1997 Apex decision, but the Stickle court held that Apex was “plainly distinguishable”
and “does not come close to the regulatory issue in this case as to whether diesel fuel and
diesel-contaminated wheat plainly come within” an entirely different definition and
provision set forth at 33 C.F.R. § 151.10(a) and not, as in Apex Oil, § 151.10(c). Id. at
1337.
205. In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, the Court upheld the trial court’s
dismissal of the indictment for alleged asbestos NESHAP work practice violations under
the rule of lenity, because the EPA’s work practices did not then constitute an emission
standard, until the CAA was later amended. 434 U.S. 275, 284–85 (1978) (“At the very
least, it may be said that the issue is subject to some doubt. Under these circumstances,
we adhere to the familiar rule that, ‘where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts
are resolved in favor of the defendant.’”) (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348
(1971)).
206. 126 F. Supp. 2d 521 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
207. Id. at 523–24.
208. Id. at 532; United States v. Am. Nat’l Can Co., No. 98 C 5133, 2001 WL
13628 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (awarding attorneys’ fees).
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2. The Government’s Adoption of the 1993 Test Method in Lieu of the
1990 Test Method Outside Clean Air Act Rulemaking Expands
the Jurisdiction of the Asbestos NESHAP in Violation of
Clean Air Act Section 307(d)
“In 1977, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to provide new
procedural requirements for EPA rulemaking under the Act, requirements
that are more stringent than those previously applicable under the
Administrative Procedure Act.”209 The CAA’s rulemaking requirements
are deliberately methodical and involve public notice, OMB review,
agency disclosure of relevant data and policy considerations, public
comments and agency responses thereto, and, most importantly, judicial
review.210 The enhanced CAA rulemaking procedures were designed to
remedy inadequacies noted by Congress in pre-1977 EPA rulemaking
under the Administrative Procedure Act.211
EPA NESHAP “applicability determinations” or “regulatory interpretations,”
such as the EPA’s multiple clarifications, are purely interpretative
guidance and not promulgated rules.212 Indeed, the EPA’s own internal
guidance disclaims reliance upon any regulatory determinations from the
EPA staff on the type of activities regulated by the NESHAP. Such
interpretations cannot be relied upon by the public, do not bind the
agency, and can be revised without public notice.213 The EPA issues
approximately one hundred nonbinding NESHAP determinations per
year, generally from its ten EPA regional offices’ NESHAP branch
chiefs.214
CAA section 307(d) defines twenty-two areas where the EPA must
conform to rulemaking to make policy the law, including NESHAP
regulations upon which criminal and civil prosecutions like SDG&E and
Harenda Enterprises can be based.215 It is well established that substantive
changes to existing CAA rules require rulemaking, while interpretative
209. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 678, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (2000).
211. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 27 (1977).
212. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
ASSURANCE, EPA 305-B-99-004, HOW TO REVIEW AND ISSUE CLEAN AIR ACT,
APPLICABILITY DETERMINATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE MONITORING (1999).
213. Id. at ii (“Disclaimer”).
214. Id. at iii (“Executive Summary”), 14.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1)(C) (2000).
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rules are exempt because they do not impose new duties and are not
otherwise binding upon the agency or public.216 A substantive change
includes CAA “test methods” and modifications thereto that expand the
jurisdictional reach of EPA regulations.217 In fact, the CAA mandates
that the EPA “may establish, by rule, test measures and other analytic
procedures.”218 EPA test methods established outside CAA rulemaking,
such as the 1993 test method, arguably have no legal significance in
criminal or civil NESHAP prosecutions.
For example, the Appalachian Power court set aside an EPA guidance
document that purported to require states issuing CAA permits to
mandate more extensive air monitoring of facilities in those permits,
even though such enhanced monitoring was not at all required by federal
law.219 The court noted the increasing “phenomenon” of creepage of
agency regulatory “law” without appropriate rulemaking, motivated in
part to immunize agency actions from judicial review:
The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress passes a broadly
worded statute. The agency follows with regulations containing broad language,
open-ended phrases, ambiguous standards and the like. Then as years pass, the
agency issues circulars or guidance or memoranda, explaining, interpreting,
defining and often expanding the commands in the regulations. One guidance
document may yield another and then another and so on.220

EPA test methods (or revisions thereto) that govern CAA compliance
constitute substantive rules that require rulemaking.221 In Donner Hanna,
the EPA threatened a coke plant operator with criminal sanctions if it
did not allow EPA compliance testing at its facility using a nonpromulgated,
“proposed” test method to measure smoke opacity from its ovens.222
The plant refused, disputing the reliability of the proposed EPA test
method and the nonbinding method’s tendency to find a higher
percentage of opacity violations.223
Consistent with SDG&E and Harenda Enterprises, only one CAA
opacity test method had been promulgated through rulemaking (adopted
in 1971 and revised in 1974) to determine the opacity of emissions using
human observers. The opacity test method was called “Revised Method
216. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020–21 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
217. Id. at 1026–27 (stating that CAA test methods “are surely ‘substantive’
requirements” that require rulemaking).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(5) (2000) (emphasis added).
219. Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1028.
220. Id. at 1020 (striking down EPA guidance document giving states “marching
orders” to require enhanced monitoring that was not required by federal law).
221. Donner Hanna Coke Corp. v. Costle, 464 F. Supp. 1295, 1304 (W.D.N.Y.
1979).
222. Id. at 1298.
223. Id. at 1298, 1301 n.6.
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9.” However, the EPA did not want to use that enumerated test method
because Revised Method 9 allowed averaging.224 Instead, in 1975 the
EPA selected parts of Revised Method 9 and added new procedures to
cobble together a unique test method specifically for coke ovens.225
However, the EPA’s recommended test method for coke ovens never
went through rulemaking, and as here, had no force of law.226 The EPA
described its new method as merely an “interpretation” of the previously
promulgated opacity test method.227 Complicating matters, the plant
operator, the EPA, and even the court found that Revised Method 9 was
not, in practical terms, appropriate for coke oven operations, where
smoke emissions are intermittent and not continuous.228 Accordingly,
there was no serious dispute that the only promulgated opacity test
method fell short. Nonetheless, the court held that the government could
not fill the void with its own nonpromulgated test method.
The promulgated smoke opacity test method in Donner Hanna
mandated averaging of twenty-four consecutive readings. The informal
EPA test method did not. The court considered the new EPA test method’s
rejection of averaging to be significant, as averaging moderates human
error and reduces the impact of erroneous results.229 As with the asbestos
NESHAP, the EPA even promised in Donner Hanna to undergo future
rulemaking in the preamble of its promulgated 1974 test method for
smoke opacity: “It is EPA’s intent to propose an additional revision to
Method 9 specifying an alternative method to enforce opacity standards.”230
In a familiar pattern, EPA never followed through but nonetheless
sought to invoke criminal sanctions based on a nonbinding test.231
The Donner Hanna court concluded that rulemaking is necessary before
the EPA’s proposed test method is available to assess CAA compliance.232
The court noted that rulemaking “produce[s] more objective testing
methods,” and “[e]nforcement officials cannot circumvent the rulemaking
requirements of the Clean Air Act by making substantial changes in

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 1301–02.
Id. at 1300–02.
Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1302–03.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1302–03.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1304.
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testing methods without notice and a hearing.”233 The “significance of
rulemaking cannot be underemphasized,” such as providing aggrieved
parties the opportunity of judicial review of those rules agencies intend
to civilly and criminally enforce.234 The Donner Hanna court stated that
the EPA’s proposed method “strayed so far from the original substance
and intent of Method 9 that it in effect created a new and different
method, not subject to the scrutiny of rulemaking procedures” and is
therefore inconsequential.235
The criminal case of United States v. Ward 236 is particularly instructive
on the due process problems of reinterpreting jurisdictional thresholds of
“regulated” material in the absence of agency rulemaking. In Ward,
criminal charges based upon an OSHA regulation were dismissed on a
pretrial motion because the government purported to demonstrate that
the material at issue was “regulated” by means and methods outside the
applicable OSHA regulation itself. The president of Concept Sciences,
Inc. (CSI) was indicted following a February 1999 explosion that killed
five individuals at CSI’s Allentown, Pennsylvania facility. The facility
manufactured hydroxylamine, a solvent for the pharmaceutical and
semiconductor industries. Hydroxylamine is unstable and explosive in
highly concentrated form.
The government charged the company’s president with willfully violating
OSHA’s “process safety management” regulation, then at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.119 (OSHA PSM Regulation). The defendant, as in SDG&E and
Harenda Enterprises, argued that the OSHA PSM Regulation did not
apply to the company’s hydroxylamine process because the material at
issue was below the “threshold quantity at which the [OSHA] Regulation
would apply” and the criminal application of the regulation “violates the
rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552, et seq.”237

233. Id. at 1305.
234. Id.
235. Id. In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, the Fifth Circuit invalidated a
comprehensive asbestos regulation ten years in the making that banned asbestos
commercial products under TSCA. 947 F.2d 1201, 1212–13 (5th Cir. 1991). The court
found EPA had changed its “methodology” outside the formal rulemaking process that
effectively bootstrapped and enhanced the purported benefits of the asbestos ban. Id.
(“In summary, on an issue of this import, the EPA should have announced during the
years in which the hearings were ongoing, rather than the subsequent weeks after which
they were closed, that it intended to use [the different methodology].”). The court
further held that a change in methodology outside the formal rulemaking process proved
fatal to ten years of EPA asbestos rulemaking, reasoning that the EPA cannot deviate
from rulemaking requirements to reach a “desired result.” Id. at 1230.
236. United States v. Ward, No. CRIM.00-681, 2001 WL 1160168 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
237. Id. at *1.
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In Ward, the OSHA PSM Regulation applied to any process that involved
a listed chemical (for example, hydroxylamine) at or above a specified
threshold quantity.238 The OSHA threshold quantity for hydroxylamine
was defined in the applicable regulation to be 2500 pounds.239 However,
the OSHA PSM Regulation failed to address the issue of whether the
regulation applied to dilute forms of hydroxylamine.240 The indictment
alleged 3520 pounds of hydroxylamine, but without any adjustment for
the amount of chemical dilution at the time of the CSI explosion.241 The
highest hydroxylamine concentration at the defendant’s plant was a
50% aqueous solution, which potentially reduced the amount of actual
hydroxylamine to 1760 pounds (one half of 3520 pounds, and potentially
below the 2500-pound OSHA regulation threshold) at the time of
explosion.242 CSI’s indicted company president argued that the regulation
plainly applied only to 100% pure hydroxylamine, and the indictment
erroneously represented that the potentially explosive dilute 50% mixture is
“regulated.”
The Ward court attempted to address three issues:
(1) Whether the OSHA PSM Regulation applies to defendant’s dilute
form of 50% hydroxylamine;
(2) Whether defendant’s hydroxylamine process exceeded the OSHA
PSM Regulation’s threshold requirements to be “regulated”
material;
(3) Whether OSHA was required to follow the rulemaking procedures
of the Administrative Procedure Act before its interpretations
of the OSHA PSM Regulation “could be enforced in a criminal
case.”243
The court held that the OSHA PSM Regulation was too ambiguous to
answer the first two questions regarding the chemical’s jurisdictional
threshold in the government’s favor, and that the government’s criminal
enforcement of its own subsequent “interpretations” of the regulation to
demonstrate jurisdiction violated the Administrative Procedure Act.244

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

29 C.F.R. § 1910.119(a)(1)(i) (2006).
29 C.F.R. app. A, § 1910.119 (2006).
Ward, 2001 WL 1160168, at *3.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *3–*4.
Id. at *23.
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The government conceded that 50% hydroxylamine was not specifically
listed in the OSHA PSM Regulation but urged the Ward court to defer to
OSHA’s subsequent and more generous interpretations (or clarifications)
of its own regulation.245 The court rejected the government’s argument,
stating that “courts should not defer to an agency’s informal interpretation
of an ambiguous statute or regulation in a criminal case.”246 The court
relied upon the Ninth Circuit’s Apex Oil decision to conclude that “strict
construction of promulgated rules and regulations is required when
implicated in a criminal case.”247 Where the required analytical method
is actually enumerated in the regulation, but the government nonetheless
disregards that test method as inconsequential, no deference is warranted
at all.248
In Ward, the agency tried to bootstrap its criminal prosecution on the
weight of interpretative guidance purporting to expand the regulation to
encompass dilute forms of hydroxylamine. The Ward court concluded
that the basic principles of administrative law and rulemaking prohibited
the application of OSHA’s informal interpretations in a criminal case
and dismissed the indictment.249
In another case, the EPA unsuccessfully attempted to expand the asbestos
NESHAP’s definition of renovation outside rulemaking in a civil matter
to include damage arising from unlawful activity—specifically trespassing
and scavenging.250 The court reasoned that, even under the deferential
Chevron standard251 for agency interpretations of regulations reserved
for noncriminal civil or administrative matters, the EPA “has gone too
far.”252 The court held the proposed EPA reinterpretation of the NESHAP
was barred by basic administrative rulemaking obligations.
The EPA cannot escape the strictures of the notice-and-comment process by
cloaking a substantive addition to the asbestos NESHAP (such as regulating
scavenging) in the guise of a mere interpretation of an extant regulation. . . . By
interpreting “renovation” to include unauthorized scavenging, the EPA attempts
to broaden the scope of the asbestos NESHAP in a substantive manner without

245. Id. at *3.
246. Id. at *8.
247. Id. at *10 (citing United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 132 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir.
1997)).
248. Id. at *9 n.5 (“[D]eference is warranted only when the language of the
regulation is ambiguous.”) (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588
(2000)).
249. Id. at *1, *23.
250. United States v. Am. Nat’l Can Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 521, 523–24 (N.D. Ill.
2000).
251. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (providing that courts may defer to agency interpretations of vague aspects of
agency regulations where civil or criminal liability is not at issue).
252. Am. Nat’l Can Co., 126 F. Supp. at 530 n.8.
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engaging in notice and comment rulemaking, and thereby violates a basic canon
of administrative law.253

Cases such as Ward, W.R. Grace, Apex Oil, Adamo Wrecking, Donner
Hanna, Corrosion Proof Fittings, American National Can and Owens
Contracting consistently instruct that the government’s reinterpretation
and jurisdictional expansion of its own regulations, such as the asbestos
NESHAP, must undergo rulemaking to be civilly or criminally enforceable.
V. CONCLUSIONS
It is not the 1990 NESHAP regulation as currently written that bears
blame for the government’s enforcement transgressions. Rather, it is the
EPA’s calculated departure from that enumerated 1990 NESHAP regulation
for purposes of unilaterally expanding its criminal and civil enforcement
jurisdiction that renders the EPA, the State of Wisconsin, and similar
enforcement programs constitutionally unsustainable. Well-settled canons
of strict construction, coupled with the rule of lenity and doctrine of fair
warning, instruct that criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions
must rest upon the bright-line jurisdictional test method set forth in the
applicable CAA regulations. In 2006, two courts held that CAA test methods
implicate important due process rights that only administrative rulemaking
can cure. In the absence of rulemaking, long-held EPA assumptions
about the use of new and nonbinding test methods are now being
rejected in court. Cases such as SDG&E and Harenda Enterprises are
253. Id. at 530. In United States v. Owens Contracting Services, Inc., the court
granted summary judgment in favor of a project’s demolition contractor and against the
government because the EPA attempted to expand the NESHAP regulation to include
nonfriable materials not regulated at the time of demolition by the pre-1990 NESHAP.
844 F. Supp. 1095, 1105 (E.D. Mich. 1994). The government offered interpretative
guidance prepared after the 1990 NESHAP amendments in support of its broad
application of the regulation to nonfriable material. The court stated that the EPA’s “decision
to expand the coverage of the asbestos NESHAP to address issues unanticipated at the
time of promulgation, i.e., nonfriable asbestos which becomes friable or has the potential
to become friable is, in kindest terms, creative. Less charitably, it could be an example
of bureaucratic arrogance.” Id.
The NESHAP was eventually amended in 1990 to encompass presently nonfriable
material at issue in Owens Contracting. However, before such 1990 rulemaking, the
application of the EPA’s interpretations to reverse engineer the jurisdictional reach of the
regulation “would stand as anathema to the requirement that administrative rules be
properly promulgated so that notice of the rules is given prior to meting out punishment
for their transgression.” Id. at 1106. The Owens Contracting court rejected the
government’s “substitution of new law for old law that was reasonably clear” through
the “guise of ‘clarification’ of pre-existing rules.” Id.
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forcing EPA to come to grips with the reality that agency policy cannot
outpace the APA and its own rulemaking obligations.
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APPENDIX A
DATE

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY HISTORY OF
ASBESTOS NESHAP & EPA TEST METHODS

Dec. 31, 1970

Congress amends CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412, requiring the
EPA to list “hazardous air pollutants” and develop
national “emission standards.”

Mar. 31, 1971

The EPA publishes its first three “hazardous air
pollutants”: asbestos, beryllium, and mercury. 36 Fed.
Reg. 5931 (Mar. 31, 1971).

Dec. 7, 1971

Proposed rule for asbestos National Emission Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP). 36 Fed. Reg.
23,239 (Dec. 7, 1971).

Apr. 6, 1973

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAP) for asbestos promulgated at 40 C.F.R. 61,
subpart B under the CAA. Asbestos content based upon
percentage based on “dry weight” in material; no
standardized test method adopted to determine
quantitatively the content of asbestos in a material based
on dry weight. 38 Fed. Reg. 8835 (Apr. 6, 1973).

Oct. 14, 1975

The asbestos NESHAP is amended to add the definition
for “friable asbestos-containing material” and specify a
minimum content of “more than 1 percent by weight.” No
analytical method specified. 40 Fed. Reg. 48,292,
48,299–302 (Oct. 14, 1975).
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LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY HISTORY OF
ASBESTOS NESHAP & EPA TEST METHODS

May 27, 1982

Adoption into law under TSCA of test method that would
ultimately become 1990 test method. “Interim Method of
the Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Insulation
Samples” promulgated at Appendix A at 40 C.F.R. part
763 under TSCA Section 6(a)(3) and Asbestos School
Hazard Detection and Control Act of 1980 regarding
asbestos in schools. Regulation addresses asbestos in
school buildings. Test method requires multi-strata
analysis and averaging of all strata of material. Asbestos;
Friable Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools;
Identification and Notification, 47 Fed. Reg. 23,360,
23,370, 23,377 § 1.7.2.1 (May 27, 1982).

Dec. 1982

The EPA’s Environmental Monitoring Systems
Laboratory publishes the “Interim Method for the
Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Insulation Samples”
(EPA-600/M4-82-020). This is a Polarized Light
Microscopy (PLM) method that requires 400 point
counting and combining the results of each layer of
multilayered material to yield an estimate of asbestos
content for the whole material. Visual area estimation is
not an option in this version.

Apr. 5, 1984

The asbestos NESHAP repromulgated by the EPA after
Supreme Court in Adamo Wrecking invalidates “work
practice” requirements as not authorized by 1970 CAA
and its “emission standards” requirement. The 1984
NESHAP amendments do not specify an analytical
method to determine material that contains “more than 1
percent asbestos by weight.” National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Amendments to
Asbestos Standard, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,658, 13,658 (Apr. 5,
1984).

Oct. 1986

Congress enacts Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response
Act (AHERA) for schools, amending the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA). 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641–
2656 (2000).
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DATE

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY HISTORY OF
ASBESTOS NESHAP & EPA TEST METHODS

Oct. 30, 1987

Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA)
regulations promulgated at 40 C.F.R. 763, subpart E under
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). Appendix E
to AHERA adopts 1990 test method (1982 TSCA test
method) requiring PLM by 400 point count and
combining the results of each layer of multilayered bulk
samples to yield an estimate of asbestos content for whole
material.

Nov. 20, 1990

The asbestos NESHAP is amended to revoke “1 percent
by weight” standard in effect since 1973 and specify new
“area test” of 1 percent as determined by 1982 TSCA and
1987 AHERA test method (“Interim Method for the
Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Insulation Samples,”
set forth at TSCA’s regulations for AHERA, 40 C.F.R.
763, subpart E). The EPA also defines Category I and
Category II materials, with Category I materials to remain
in place during demolition because of low risk of
releasing fibers. National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP Provision,
55 Fed. Reg. 48,406, 48,410, 48,415 (Nov. 20, 1990).

July 1993

The EPA Atmospheric Research and Exposure
Assessment Laboratory publishes the “Method for the
Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Building Materials”
(EPA/600/R-93/116). This PLM test method contains
“significant revisions” to procedures outlined in the 1990
test method, including visual estimation techniques and
delayering of nonseparable layers in multilayered systems.

227

HOWARD.DOC

DATE

8/16/2007 9:40:19 AM

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY HISTORY OF
ASBESTOS NESHAP & EPA TEST METHODS

Jan. 5, 1994

The EPA’s first clarification in response to “many
questions about analyzing multi-layered systems.” The
“clarification does not supersede, alter, or in any way
replace the existing asbestos NESHAP.” In general, when
a sample consists of two or more layers or materials, the
EPA advises that each layer should be treated separately
and the results reported by layer (discrete stratum). The
one exception is for wallboards (that is, joint compound,
joint tape, and wallboard), when a multi-strata composite
average should be conducted. The EPA excludes
wallboard systems from a layer-by-layer analysis on the
grounds that it “in effect becomes one material.”
Asbestos NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of
Multi-layered Systems, 59 Fed. Reg. 542, 542 (Jan. 5,
1994).

Aug. 1994

NVLAP “Bulk Asbestos Analysis” NIST Handbook 150-3
(Aug. 1994) requiring laboratory compliance to 1990 test
method or current EPA 1993 test method, but laboratories
“responsible for ensuring it implements the latest revision
of the method.”

Aug. 1, 1994

EPA advisory of availability of “improved” 1993 asbestos
bulk sample test method, “Method for the Determination
of Asbestos in Bulk Building Materials” (EPA/600/R93/116). The EPA directs laboratories to follow the
“preferred substitute method” and delayer multilayered
systems. The EPA acknowledges that there is no
modification of the governing regulations and test results
following the 1990 test method. Advisory Regarding
Availability of an Improved Asbestos Bulk Sample
Analysis Test Method; Supplementary Information on
Bulk Sample Collection and Analysis, 59 Fed. Reg.
38,970, 38,971 (Aug. 1, 1994).
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DATE

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY HISTORY OF
ASBESTOS NESHAP & EPA TEST METHODS

Dec. 19, 1995

The EPA’s second clarification regarding analysis of
multilayered systems. It states the EPA’s “unwritten
policy” has been to require delayering and “no averaging
or dilution” by combining the results of all strata. The
EPA states that the 1990 test method requires a combined
result for all layers, which contradicts the EPA’s
unwritten policy. The EPA finds the 1993 test method
(EPA/600/R-93/116) an acceptable alternative method to
the 1990 test method at Appendix E of AHERA. “EPA
intends to amend the asbestos NESHAP in the near future
to refer specifically to these procedures.” Asbestos
NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of MultiLayered Systems, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,243, 65,243 (Dec.19,
1995).

Dec. 19, 1995
to Present

Despite two EPA clarifications to the 1990 test method
and multilayered systems since adoption on November 20,
1990, there have been no amendments (or proposed
amendments) to the asbestos NESHAP to adopt the 1993
test method; the 1990 test method remains the law.
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